Should the Courts Save Taxpayer Standing? - Interpreting Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation Narrowly through the Lens of Judicial-Branch Spending by Shapiro, Akiva
The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 
Volume 10 Issue 2 Article 4 
2009 
Should the Courts Save Taxpayer Standing? - Interpreting Hein v. 
Freedom from Religion Foundation Narrowly through the Lens of 
Judicial-Branch Spending 
Akiva Shapiro 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Akiva Shapiro, Should the Courts Save Taxpayer Standing? - Interpreting Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation Narrowly through the Lens of Judicial-Branch Spending, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 273 
(2009). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess/vol10/iss2/4 
This document is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process by an authorized administrator of 
Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
SHOULD THE COURTS SAVE TAXPAYER STANDING?
INTERPRETING HEIN V. FREEDOM FROM RELIGION




Over the course of the 2006-07 Term, the Supreme Court's
first full year with Chief Justice Roberts at the helm, the Court
handed down a series of five-four decisions on a broad range of
politically divisive issues.1 One of the last of these decisions,
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.,2 turned on a
technical question of taxpayer standing. Justice Alito (writing
for a plurality) interpreted Flast v. Cohen, the classic case that
opened the door to taxpayer standing in cases of government
spending in violation of the Establishment Clause, to have
upheld taxpayer standing only because there was a "specific
* Associate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (New York); J.D., Columbia; M.A., Yale
(Religious Studies). I would like to thank three people without whom this article would
never have been completed: Nathan Lewin, who brought the Hein case to my attention, and
with whom I attended the Hein oral argument at the Supreme Court; Vince Blasi, the
source of sage advice and unswerving encouragement-not to mention inspiring First
Amendment and tort theory pedagogy-since my first semester of law school; and Kent
Greenawalt, who read early drafts and provided invaluable comments.
1. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
115, 115 ("Amidst a flurry of controversial decisions in the final days of the 2006-07 Term,
the Supreme Court delivered its opinions in Hein.") (footnotes omitted); Linda
Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, 156 N.Y. Times Al
(July 1, 2007) (discussing series of hotly disputed five-four decisions, including Hein);
Jewish Daily Forward, Blind Justice, http://www.forward.com/articles/l 1080 (July 3,
2007) [hereinafter Blind Justice] (noting that Court's then-recent "decisions touching on
racial equity, church-state separation, antitrust regulation and more, cap[ped] off ... the
court's first full year under Chief Justice John Roberts") (accessed July 1, 2009; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
2. 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
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congressional enactment" that "expressly authorized or
mandated" the challenged expenditure. 3 As the executive branch
spending at issue in Hein was from general Congressional
appropriations, and the decision to spend funds for arguably
religious purposes was an act of executive discretion, the
plurality concluded that Flast did not apply; having reached this
conclusion, the plurality declined to "extend" Flast, and held
that the respondents lacked standing.4
Despite the technical nature of the taxpayer-standing
holding, the decision generated an outpouring of negative press,
as the case implicated deep church-state concerns. The
criticisms came in two distinct forms. First, critics objected to
Hein on normative grounds, arguing that it effectively insulated
large swaths of government spending from Establishment
Clause challenge, and thereby threatened to undermine judicial
enforcement of the Clause.5 Second, legal commentators
3. Hein, 551 U.S. at 608-10 (interpreting and applying Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968)).
4. Id. at 609. The Alito plurality opinion is written in an overtly minimalist tone,
declining to address the merits or underlying rationale of Flast because "[w]e decide only
the case at hand" and concluding that the case at hand can be distinguished from Flast;
therefore "[w]e do not extend Flast .... We leave Flast as we found it." Id. at 615. Despite
the plurality's purporting to leave Flast unaltered, its opinion was "implicitly quite critical
of the precedent[,]" and effectively narrowed what had been the prevailing interpretation of
Flast. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject Suit on Federal Money for Faith-Based Office,
N.Y. Times Online (June 26, 2007) (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/26/
washington/26faith.html?scp=l &sq=justices%20reject%20suit$20federal$20money%2Ofo
r/o20faith&st-cse (accessed July 1, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process)); see also Robert Corn-Revere, Federalism and Separation of Powers:
Narrow Issue of Taxpayer Standing Highlights Wide Divisions Among the Justices, 2006-
07 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 215, 234 (criticizing plurality for purporting to leave Flast "as
[they] found it" but "as a practical matter ... marginaliz[ing] the concept of taxpayer
standing").
5. Robyn Blumner, Bush Merges Church & State, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review (July 8,
2007) (criticizing the Court in Hein for "help[ing] insulate Bush's faith-based agenda from
legitimate legal challenge," claiming that "[t]here is now a four-member conservative
plurality of the Roberts court that is openly hostile toward those who seek to keep their tax
money from flowing into religious coffers," and asserting that "[tjhe dismantled wall
between church and state will be just another one of Bush's disastrous legacies"); Blind
Justice, supra n. I (calling the Hein decision "damaging to minority rights" because it
"limited the right of citizens to challenge religious encroachments on government" and
stating that the "same ... tortured logic and contempt for precedent, all in the service of
right-wing ideology, showed up in one decision after another this year"); but see Editorial:
The Roberts Court, Wash. Times A] 6 (June 27, 2007) (characterizing the ruling in Hein as
"a victory for the democratic process insofar as it pushes contentious social issues out of
the courts and back into the court of public opinion, where they belong").
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criticized-in the harshest of terms-the logic of the plurality
opinion, which made a sharp distinction between Congressional
spending that supported standing in Flast and Executive Branch
spending of general Congressional appropriations that did not in
Hein.6 Noting that the injury-spending a taxpayer's money for
religious purposes-was identical in both cases, these critics
blasted the plurality for its "utterly meaningless" and
"intellectually... indefensible" distinction.7
But by explicitly refusing to discuss the applicability of the
decision-and the viability of Flast-outside the specific
6. See e.g. Marci Hamilton, Three Important Developments Involving Law and
Religion During the Summer of 2007, Findlaw.com, http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/
hamilton/20070906.html (Sept. 6, 2007) (stating that the plurality's claim that taxpayer
standing is only permitted where Congress specifically designated that the funds be used
for religious purposes is "simply intellectually and morally indefensible" because the
"harm identified by Flast is certainly present in Hein: taxpayers' fumds were being used to
support a religious mission") (accessed July 6, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process); Robert H. Bork, 4 + 1-And the 1 Is Justice Kennedy, National
Review (July 30, 2007) (stating that "[t]he basis for a constitutional distinction between
congressional and presidential spending is, to say the least, elusive," and calling
"irrefutable" Justice Scalia's criticism that the plurality's opinion is rooted in "meaningless
and disingenuous distinctions"); Vikram David Amar, The Supreme Court Denies Plaintiffs
Standing to Challenge Bush Administration Activities that They Allege Violated the
Establishment Clause, Findlaw.com, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20070706.html
(July 6, 2007) ("The line the Hein Court draws-between Congress and Executive
programs to promote religion-makes absolutely no sense.") (accessed July 6, 2009; copy
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
7. Hein, 551 U.S. at 618, 628, 630 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment)
(stating that "there is no intellectual justification" for the "utterly meaningless" distinction
drawn by the plurality, and that the reasoning of the plurality is not "sane" and "invites
demonstrably absurd results"); Hamilton, supra n. 6 (calling the distinction "simply
intellectually and morally indefensible").
In addition to these two criticisms, two other authors have examined and criticized
the plurality opinion in Hein succinctly, in the style of case reports, on the ground that it
incentivizes Congress and the Executive to collude in hiding policy choices (through
general appropriations) in order to evade judicial review in Establishment Clause spending
cases. See The Supreme Court, 2006 Term: Leading Case: Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure-Standing-Establishment Clause Violations, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 325, 326, 331
(criticizing "illusory distinction" drawn in Hein between Congressional spending and
executive spending that "incentivizes Congress to avoid explicitly expressing its policy
choices, thus undermining nondelegation principles"); Corn-Revere, supra n. 4, at 237
(criticizing Hein because it "create[s] a road map by which the executive may
circumnavigate judicial standing in Establishment Clause cases altogether, simply by
supporting religious institutions on its own initiative"); see also Lauren S. Michaels,
Student Author, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation: Sitting This One Out-
Denying Taxpayer Standing to Challenge Faith-Based Funding, 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 213, 237 (2008) ("[T]he Court was satisfied in Hein to leave the other branches to
check themselves.").
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Executive Branch spending setting of the case, 8 the plurality
opinion left open many important questions with which the
lower courts have already begun to grapple. First and foremost
is whether and how Hein applies in taxpayer spending cases
outside the federal Executive Branch. After Hein, does the
simple collection and expenditure of funds in violation of the
Establishment Clause by Congress or a state still give rise to
taxpayer standing, as long as the spending is not limited to the
federal Executive Branch? Or does the Hein pronouncement that
taxpayer standing only lies where there is a "specific
[legislative] enactment" that "expressly authorize[s] or
mandate[s]" the challenged expenditure apply even in federal
non-Executive cases and in cases implicating state and
municipal taxpayer standing?
This article raises these questions, and suggests-through
the lens of Judicial Branch spending-that the approach taken
by many courts thus far is deeply problematic. In a host of
cases, the broader interpretation of Hein already seems to be
taking hold, as many courts have applied the Alito plurality
directly (or as directly as possible, at any rate) in a number of
non-Executive Branch taxpayer spending cases, despite the
executive-specific separation-of-powers and administrability
concerns at the heart of the opinion.10 Based on this developing
8. Hein, 551 U.S. at 615 ("[W]e have never extended [Flast's] narrow exception to a
purely discretionary Executive Branch expenditure. We need go no further to decide this
case. Relying on the provision of the Constitution that limits our role to resolving the
'Cases' and 'Controversies' before us, we decide only the case at hand.").
9. Federal judicial spending cases provide a good template with which to examine the
applicability of Hein for three reasons. First, because it is the one federal branch that the
Court did not discuss in Hein, the judiciary provides a blank slate on which to project the
reasoning of Hein outside its specific holding. Second, none of the complications of
federal/state or federal/local-taxpayer standing are implicated in the analysis. Third,
because it is the area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence that has received the least
amount of attention by commentators and academics, the discussion of judicial violations
will itself be an important contribution to the literature. However, as noted above, the
conclusions about the applicability of Hein to Judicial Branch spending serve a larger
purpose: Judicial spending provides a relatively straightforward lens through which to
capture Hein; the picture developed through this article (which questions the already-
coalescing standard reading) will be applicable in federal legislative cases and in state and
local taxpayer cases, which together constitute the vast majority of taxpayer-standing cases.
10. See e.g. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 499-500 (5th Cir. 2007)
(en bane) (DeMoss, J., concurring) (applying Hein in an eight-to-seven decision to deny
plaintiff parent standing to sue school board from opening its meetings with a prayer);
Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House, Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584, 597-600 (7th Cir.
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trend, two leading scholars of the Religion Clauses-in the most
thorough examination of the implications of Hein since the
decision was handed down-see the threat of Hein's narrowing
of taxpayer standing bleeding into standing for Establishment
Clause violations generally, a development that would
undermine citizens' access to the courts to contest Establishment
Clause violations at every level and branch of government.11 At
the same time, a significant minority of courts and judges have
questioned the applicability of Hein outside its federal
executive-specific context.
Against this backdrop of confusion and disagreement, there
are at least two reasons that lower courts should stop the
bleeding. First, a full Marks12 analysis, applied properly, leads to
the conclusion that there is no precedent-setting opinion in Hein,
or at the very least that the narrower Kennedy concurrence is
controlling. 13 Under either conclusion, courts are free to apply
the pre-Hein standard in spending cases that involve
governmental entities outside the federal Executive Branch.
14
Second, because Justice Alito's plurality opinion is best read as
a decision primarily concerned with Executive Branch
2007) (applying Hein in dismissing state taxpayer-standing action alleging that the practice
of legislative prayer in the Indiana House of Representatives violated the Establishment
Clause); Mainstreet Org. of Realtors v. Calumet City, 505 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Sykes, J., concurring) (citing Hein in concluding that "if the Supreme Court's recent
standing jurisprudence means anything, it is that constitutional standing prerequisites are to
be closely monitored and scrupulously enforced"); but see e.g. Pelphrey v. Cobb County,
495 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1318 n. 3 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (distinguishing Hein as "inapposite" in
upholding municipal taxpayer standing to sue county board of commissioners and county
planning commission for practice of beginning meetings with invocational prayers).
11. Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 1, at 119 ("After Hein, the issue of standing is likely to
become an active battleground.... [S]ome [lower courts] may view Hein as an invitation
to narrow considerably the access that Establishment Clause plaintiffs have to the federal
courts. Moreover, such a narrowing may extend beyond the specialized field of taxpayer
standing to more general doctrines under which... plaintiffs in Establishment Clause cases
have been granted standing without having suffered any injury traditionally recognized
under Article III."). Others have also examined (and criticized) the plurality opinion in
Hein. See generally e.g. n. 7, supra.
12. Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (laying out framework for lower court
analysis of precedential effect of fragmented opinions). Thus far, courts have uniformly
treated the Alito plurality opinion as controlling, and many-perhaps most-have
neglected to conduct a Marks analysis at all. See infra nn. 115-30 and accompanying text
(discussing and applying the Marks analysis to Hein).
13. See infra nn. 115-30 and accompanying text.
14. See id.
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independence from the judiciary (and executive-specific
prudential administrability), rather than the absence of
irreducible Article III injury in fact, lower courts should adopt
an interpretation of the Alito plurality that remains loyal to the
opinion by limiting the effect of the decision on taxpayer
spending cases outside the realm of federal executive
spending.15
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: Part II
provides-for the first time-a taxonomy and systematic
examination of judicial violations of the Establishment Clause, a
little-analyzed area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In
the course of surveying and discussing the primary categories of
judicial violations of the Establishment Clause, it highlights
those violations that might give rise to taxpayer spending.
Part III turns to Hein itself: Section A discusses the factual
background of the case; section B presents the lower court
decisions in the case; section C discusses the four opinions in
the Supreme Court decision of the case; and section D analyzes
the four opinions in light of the Marks doctrine, and
demonstrates that under Marks, there is either no binding
opinion in Hein, or the controlling opinion is the Executive
Branch-specific Kennedy concurrence.
Part IV turns to the interpretation and application of Justice
Alito's plurality opinion, in light of the fact that courts have
almost uniformly assumed that it is controlling. Section A
presents the prevailing interpretation of the plurality opinion by
the courts; it shows that courts are already divided on whether a
straightforward application of the plurality opinion to taxpayer
spending cases outside the federal Executive Branch is feasible,
and argues that such an approach leads to results that cannot be
justified by the opinion's language and logic. Section B argues
that the plurality opinion's denial of taxpayer standing, read
properly, is in fact based in separation of powers and prudential
standing concerns particular to the Executive Branch, rather than
the absence of Article III injury. Section C applies this reading
to judicial spending cases, and demonstrates that Hein does not
limit taxpayer standing in judicial spending cases. Finally,
15. See infra nn. 147-55 and accompanying text. Of course, for those courts that accept
either that there is no controlling opinion in Hein, or that the Kennedy concurrence is
controlling, my interpretation of the plurality opinion will be largely academic.
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Section D discusses major critiques of my reading of Justice
Alito's plurality opinion.
The Conclusion then offers some preliminary thoughts on
the implications of this interpretation of Hein for other taxpayer
spending cases outside the federal executive spending context,
and suggests that lower courts can and should save taxpayer
standing (and make sense of Hein) either by applying the Marks
doctrine to limit the precedential effect of Hein, or by
interpreting the Alito plurality opinion in its executive-specific
context.
II. JUDICIAL VIOLATIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The classic description of the meaning of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause is found in Everson v.
Board of Education: 16
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. 17
16. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
17. Id. at 15-16. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the substantive
interpretation and meaning of the Establishment Clause as it has developed since Everson.
For a thorough discussion and analysis of the current (confused) state of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, see Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four
Establishment Clauses, 8 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 725 (2006), in which the author points out that
[i]t is by now axiomatic that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is a mess-both hopelessly confused and deeply contradictory. On
a purely doctrinal level, the Court cannot even settle on one standard to apply in
all Establishment Clause cases. At some point during the last ten years, one or
more of the nine Justices have articulated ten different Establishment Clause
standards. Many of the Justices have endorsed several different-and often
conflicting-constitutional standards.... The situation is even more confused at
the theoretical level.
Id. at 725 (footnote omitted). The leading casebook on the Religion Clauses, Michael W.
McConnell et al., Religion and the Constitution (2d ed., Aspen Publishers, Inc. 2006), is a
useful starting point for research.
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The Establishment Clause has been understood to apply to
the activities of all levels' 8 and branches of government,'
9
including the judiciary. 2 However, despite a fair number of
cases that apply the Establishment Clause to judicial acts, there
is very little scholarship that focuses on judicial violations of the
Clause, and no comprehensive survey of such violations.2z
In this Part, I provide just such a survey and taxonomy of
judicial violations of the Establishment Clause, with special
emphasis on violations that could give rise to taxpayer
standing.22 Section A discusses violations by judges acting
outside the scope of their strictly judicial duties. A thorough
investigation of the case law reveals that this type of violation
generally arises in two contexts: judges arranging for Ten
18. See ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The
modem Supreme Court ... has treated the establishment clause as a directive to the courts
to strike down all public acts, federal, state, and local, whose primary purpose or
predominant effect is to promote one religious group at the expense of others or even
promote religion as a whole at the expense of the nonreligious[.]").
19. See e.g. Kent Greenawalt, History as Ideology: Philip Hamburger's Separation of
Church and State, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 367, 375 (2005) ("In modem times, construing the First
Amendment to apply only to statutes adopted by legislatures would be unthinkable.");
Hein, 551 U.S. at 639-40 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("[N]o one
has suggested that the Establishment Clause lacks applicability to executive uses of
money."); see also Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1140-43 (10th Cir. 2006)
(McConnell, J.) (discussing at length and rejecting the contention that the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses do not apply to exercises of executive authority).
20. See e.g. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing
and rejecting the contention that the Establishment Clause does not apply to the judicial
branch); Scott C. Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking, 81
Marq. L. Rev. 537, 553 (1998) ("[W]ithout question these [Establishment Clause]
proscriptions apply to judges, both federal and state, no less than to other governmental
actors.")
21. The one area in which there has been some attention paid by commentators is that
of the propriety of an individual judge relying on her personal religious views in reaching a
legal conclusion. This topic falls within the larger conversation about the role of religion in
politics and public morality; to the extent that it has relevance for the analysis of judicial
violations of the Establishment Clause, it will be drawn on at a later point.
22. There are two main areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence: (1) public
manifestations of religion by government and (2) government financial support of religious
institutions. Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
Establishment Clause, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 673, 679 (2002) (characterizing these topics as
"the two most important doctrinal areas of the Establishment Clause"). As a practical
matter, judicial conduct implicates the Establishment Clause only in the former category,
as the judicial branch does not independently fund non-governmental institutions or
provide grants to such institutions. Thus, both of the types of violations discussed in this
Part fall within the broad confines of public manifestations of religion by government.
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Commandments displays to be placed in a courtroom or
courthouse,23 and judges opening court with a prayer.24 Section
B discusses violations by judges acting within the scope of their
strictly judicial duties; in particular, it focuses on judges issuing
opinions and making sentencing decisions on religious
grounds.
A. Conduct of Judges Acting Outside the Scope
of Their Judicial Duties
1. Ten Commandments Displays
Courts have, with some regularity, criticized individual
judges on Establishment Clause grounds for setting up Ten
Commandments displays in their courtrooms or courthouses.26
23. See e.g. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284 (noting that "[tihe Chief Justice of the
Alabama Supreme Court installed a two-and-one-half ton monument to the Ten
Commandments as the centerpiece of the rotunda in the Alabama State Judicial Building").
24. See e.g. N.C. Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145,
1146 (4thCir. 1991) (indicating that the state trial judge whose behavior was at issue would
enter his courtroom, "sit down, turn on a light at his bench, and say, 'Let us pause for a
moment of prayer,"' and then utter a prayer addressed to "0 Lord, our God, our Father in
Heaven").
25. This distinction is made in Glassroth, where then-Chief Justice Moore arranged for
(and refused to remove) a large granite tablet containing the Ten Commandments in the
state courthouse. The Eleventh Circuit noted that it had the authority to review the conduct
of the Chief Justice because, though "state courts when acting judicially, which they do
when deciding cases brought before them by litigants, are not bound to agree with or apply
the decisions of federal district courts and courts of appeal[,]" the circumstances in the case
were somewhat different:
At issue here is not a judicial decision of the Alabama Supreme Court, eight-
ninths of which had nothing to do with the challenged action. At issue here is the
conduct of a party, who concedes he acted not judicially but as the
administrative head of a state government department, and in that capacity his
conduct is subject to as much scrutiny as that of any head of any government
department.
Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1302 n. 6.
26. See e.g. ACLU of Ohio Found, Inc. v. Ashbrook, 211 F. Supp.2d 873, 888, 893
(N.D. Ohio 2002) (concluding that state judge's display of the Ten Commandments in his
courtroom constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause because the judge's purpose
was "at heart, religious in nature" and a "reasonable observer" would think that the state
judge and the State of Ohio were "endorsing" a religion); Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F.
Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that the display of the Ten Commandments on a
county courthouse wall constituted an establishment of religion), affld, 15 F.3d 1097 (11 th
Cir. 1994); Deborah Tedford, Suit Asks To Bar Commandments from Courtroom, Houston
Chron. A39 (Dec. 11, 1997) (discussing an action filed against a Texas state court judge
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In a recent case, then-Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice
Roy Moore arranged for a massive granite monument bearing
the Ten Commandments to be placed in the Alabama courthouse
in which his court sat. He was sued personally in federal district
court under the Establishment Clause.
The district court held that this placement of the Ten
Commandments violated the Establishment Clause. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed and discussed the applicability of the
Establishment Clause to the judiciary. The court first noted that
[t]he First Amendment does not say that no government
official may take any action respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. It says that
"Congress shall make no law" doing that. Chief Justice
Moore is not Congress.
27
Nonetheless, the court made clear that "the religion clauses of
the First Amendment apply to all laws, not just those enacted by
Congress, '28 as the religion clauses bind every branch and level
of government. 29  Moreover, the court stated that the
Establishment Clause limits government conduct in all its forms,
even when it is not strictly law-making. 30 Thus, the court applied
the traditional Lemon test 3' to Chief Justice Moore's conduct,
whose courtroom was adorned with a poster of the Ten Commandments). For analysis of a
similar opinion, see, for example, Rick Bragg, Judge Allows God's Law To Mix with
Alabama's, 146 N.Y. Times A14 (Feb. 13, 1997) (discussing an earlier Alabama case
involving then-Judge Moore's display of the Ten Commandments in his trial courtroom);
Derek H. Davis, Religion and the Abuse of Judicial Power, 39 J. Church & State 203
(1997) (critiquing judges' conduct in the then-pending Alabama and Texas cases).
27. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1293.
28. Id. (citing Everson).
29. Id.
30. In the context of this discussion, the court considered a somewhat obscure principle
enunciated by the Supreme Court: that, when looking at state-attributable conduct that is
not strictly law-making, the analysis of the courts should proceed "as if a ... statute
decreed that the [conduct] must occur." Id. at 1294; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
587 (1992) ("A school official, the principal, decided that an invocation and a benediction
should be given; this is a choice attributable to the State, and from a constitutional
perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must occur."); Jaffree v.
Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1534 (11 th Cir. 1983) (concluding that "if a statute authorizing
the teachers' activities would be unconstitutional, then the activities, in the absence of a
statute, are also unconstitutional").
31. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (establishing three-prong test for
Establishment Clause violations that looks to the purpose, effect, and possibility of
"excessive government entanglement with religion" of the challenged government
conduct). Note that the Lemon test has been criticized, limited, and (at times) ignored over
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and found that the placement of the monument failed the first
two prongs: It violated the Establishment Clause due to both its
purpose and its effects.33
Given the costs inevitably associated with the purchase,
placement, and upkeep of a Ten Commandments display,
taxpayers will often be able to point to government expenditures
in such a case in arguing for taxpayer standing.
2. Opening Court with a Prayer
Less frequently, courts have passed on the constitutionality
of a judge's opening court with a prayer.34  In Constangy,
plaintiffs brought an Establishment Clause challenge against a
state trial judge in North Carolina, hoping to permanently enjoin
him from opening court with a prayer. The district court ruled
that the judge's practice violated the Establishment Clause, and
the Fourth Circuit affirmed.36 The defendant argued that his
prayer in court "is his personal prayer and thus it does not result
in government endorsement of religion."37 However, the Fourth
the years. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring) (noting that as many as six Justices have "driven
pencils through the . . . [Lemon test's] heart"); Stephen M. Feldman, Divided We Fall:
Religion, Politics, and the Lemon Entanglement Prong, 7 First Amend. L. Rev. 253, 269-
77 (2009) (discussing checkered application of the Lemon test by Supreme Court). Most
importantly, the entanglement prong has arguably been folded into the effects prong by
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), leaving (according to many commentators and
some members of the Court) a two-prong test in its wake. See e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ashlie C. Warnick,
Accommodating Discrimination, 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 119, 140-42 (2008). However, despite
sustained criticism, the Lemon test has still been routinely applied (sometimes in modified
form) by many courts, including the Eleventh Circuit in Glassroth.
32. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1296 ("Chief Justice Moore testified candidly that his
purpose in placing the monument in the Judicial Building was to acknowledge the law and
sovereignty of the God of the Holy Scriptures.").
33. Id. at 1297 (quoting district court's finding in Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d
1290, 1304 (M.D. Ala. 2002), that a reasonable observer "would feel as though the State of
Alabama is advancing or endorsing, favoring or preferring, Christianity").
34. See e.g. Collmer v. Edmondson, 16 Fed. Appx. 876, 877-78 (10th Cir. 2001)
(noting that state trial judge's prayer in open court before prospective jurors "troubled"
appellate bench "in light of the well-known constitutional dictate that the establishment of
religion by government is not permitted[,]" while holding that the prayer did not
substantially impair the fairness of the trial for the purposes of habeas corpus relief).
35. 947 F.2d 1145.
36. Id. at 1152-53.
37. Id. at 1151.
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Circuit found this argument "wholly unpersuasive," as "a judge
wearing a robe and speaking from the bench is obviously
engaging in official conduct."
3
The Constangy court also distinguished Marsh v.
Chambers,39 a case that permitted prayer before legislative
sessions, because, unlike prayer in the legislative context,
"[j]udicial prayer in the courtroom is not legitimated.., by past
history or present practice." 40  Moreover, in discussing
legislative and judicial prayer, the court implied that a judge
should be held to a higher standard than a legislator: "[U]nlike
judges, legislators do not have an obligation to be neutral ....
Because a judge must be a neutral decisionmaker, prayer in
court by a judge has far more potential for establishing religion
than legislative prayer."41 After disposing of these preliminary
issues, the court then applied the Lemon test to the defendant
judge's morning in-court prayers and concluded that they failed
in at least two of the three Lemon prongs-effect and
entanglement 42 -and arguably failed in the third prong, purpose,
as well.43
More recently, the issue of judicial prayer or invocations
was discussed in Justice Scalia's concurrence in Hein, which is
the only instance-in any of the four Hein opinions-at which
there is any discussion of judicial violations of the
Establishment Clause. Justice Scalia suggests that if the Court
upholds taxpayer standing in every instance in which the
government expends funds:
Any taxpayer would be able to sue whenever tax funds
were used in alleged violation of the Establishment Clause.
So, for example, any taxpayer could challenge the fact that
the Marshal of our Court is paid, in part, to call the
38. Id. at 1149 (noting that "a judge presiding over a court is the court").
39. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
40. Constangy, 947 F.2d at 1149.
41. Id. (stating that "[flor a judge to engage in prayer in court entangles governmental
and religious functions to a much greater degree than a chaplain praying before the
legislature").
42. See id. at 1151 (indicating that "the primary effect of Judge Constangy's prayer was
to advance and endorse religion"), 1152 (concluding that "Judge Constangy's practice of
praying in court .. excessively entangle[es] the government with religion").
43. Id. at 1150.
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courtroom to order by proclaiming "God Save the United
States and this Honorable Court."
The clear implication is that this kind of action should not
be permitted. However, Justice Scalia's hypothetical case is
easily distinguishable from non-Supreme Court judicial prayer
cases, as the invocation by the Marshal of the Supreme Court is
explicitly categorized by the Court as an example of ceremonial
deism, one in a limited number of circumstances in which
"government can... acknowledge or refer to the divine without
offending the Constitution" because of the "history, character,
and context" of the activity.45 Judicial prayer in forums other
than the Supreme Court, in courtrooms where there is no
longstanding practice of offering an invocation, and where there
is no traditional, formal, fixed invocation, would likely not pass
Constitutional muster.
Even though the funds expended on such prayers would be
miniscule, the alleged damage would still be judicially
cognizable in a taxpayer action if the taxpayer-standing doctrine
were to be extended to its logical limit, as it is premised on the
position that even "three pence" spent in violation of the
Establishment Clause is constitutionally problematic and
46
injurious.
44. Hein, 551 U.S. at 632 (2007) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
45. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (asserting that the "category of 'ceremonial deism' most
clearly encompasses such things as the national motto ('In God We Trust'), religious
references in traditional patriotic songs such as the Star-Spangled Banner, and the words
with which the Marshal of this Court opens each of its sessions ('God save the United
States and this honorable Court')"); see also Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 626, 630
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (taking position
that "[p]ractices such as legislative prayers or opening Court sessions with 'God save the
United States and this honorable Court"' are rituals that "serve the secular purpose of
solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the
recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society" and are "examples of ceremonial
deism," and thus do not violate the Establishment Clause) (citations and some internal
quotation marks omitted)).
46. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 638 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
The Writings of James Madison vol. 2, 183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons
1901)).
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B. Religiously Motivated and Facially Non-Neutral
Judicial Decisions
In this section I will address the Establishment Clause
status of religiously motivated judicial decisions, both those that
do not explicitly invoke religious authority in reaching a
decision and those that do. For example, what is the status of a
sentencing in which the jude premises the harshness of the
sentence on religious values? What is the status of an opinion
whose holding is explicitly based on a Biblical verse?48 Do these
scenarios raise Establishment Clause red flags, and when do
they amount to Establishment Clause violations?
1. The Role of a Judge's Personal Religious Beliefs in the
Process of Decisionmaking
The personal religious beliefs of a judge or other political
officer are often difficult to ascertain. The role that those beliefs
play when a judge reaches a given legal decision is almost
impossible to capture in a given case, especially when the judge
does not explicitly reference his religious beliefs in his opinions
47. Cf U.S. v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding, on due process
rather than establishment grounds, that sentence should be overturned because of the
judge's "impermissibly tak[ing] his own religious characteristics into account in
sentencing"); Arnett v. Jackson, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20645 at *18 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(noting that "[t]his Court has grave doubts about the propriety under the Establishment
Clause of the state judge's express reference in open court to New Testament scripture as
the last source she consulted in deciding the appropriate sentence for petitioner," and
holding that the Establishment Clause claim was waived but the due process claim was
valid), rev'd 393 F.3d 681, 687-88 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Because the record does not
demonstrate that the judge's personally held religious beliefs formed 'the basis of [her]
sentencing decision,' we conclude that Arnett's due process rights were not violated by the
judge's Biblical reference at sentencing."); see also id. at 691 (Clay, J., dissenting) ("When
... a judge directly and publicly relies on a religious source to reach a specific legal result,
she flouts a defendant's fundamental expectation that he will not be adjudged according to
any religious tenets, regardless of whether the sentencing judge herself adheres to those
tenets.").
48. See e.g. Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Until... [the mother] can establish.., that she
is no longer a lesbian living a life of abomination (see Leviticus 18:22), she should be
totally estopped from contaminating these children."); see also Kent Greenawalt, Private
Consciences and Public Reasons 142 n. 2 (Oxford U. Press 1995) (citing Chicoine after
noting that "[iun the nineteenth century .. .judges occasionally mentioned Christian
teachings to help support legal conclusions," but that "[o]ne does not often find such
mentions today").
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and statements in open court. Despite these and other practical
difficulties, there has been a fair amount of analysis of whether
and when it is appropriate for citizens and political actors to
seek to enact laws or make public decisions based on their
religious beliefs or premised on religious doctrines, 49 and a
smaller, but still substantial, body of work examining the proper
role of the judge's religious beliefs and values in the process of
judicial decisionmaking.
Despite vigorous disagreement over the exact limits and
scope of judicial reliance on religious beliefs, much of it
counseling for wide latitude in this regard,5 there is underlying
consensus, even from the strongest defenders of the propriety of
relying on religious values in judicial decisionmaking, that when
a judge's reliance on religious values is for the purpose of
49. See e.g. Symposium: Religion and Morality in the Public Square, 22 St. John's J.L.
Comm. 417, 417-558 (2007) (containing seven papers presented by leading scholars of law
and religion); Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the
Establishment Clause, 12 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Policy 1 (2002); Michael J. Perry, Why
Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality is Not Illegitimate in a Liberal
Democracy, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 217 (2001); Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and
Secular Reason (Cambridge U. Press 2000); Michael J. Perry, Religion in Politics:
Constitutional and Moral Perspectives (Oxford U. Press 1997); Greenawalt, supra n. 48;
David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A
Response to Professor Perry, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1067 (1991); Michael J. Perry, Love and
Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American Politics (Oxford U. Press 1991);
Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (Oxford U. Press 1987).
50. See e.g. Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension
of Judicial Decision Making, 53 Cath. U.L. Rev. 709 (2004); Mark B. Greenlee, Faith on
the Bench: The Role of Religious Belief in the Criminal Sentencing Decisions of Judges, 26
U. Dayton L. Rev. 1 (2000); Symposium: Religion and the Judicial Process: Legal, Ethical,
and Empirical Dimensions, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 177 (1998); Greenawalt, supra n. 48, at 147-
49 (presenting and assessing four uses of religious values that do not directly implicate a
judge's own religious beliefs); Scott C. Idleman, Student Author, The Role of Religious
Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 Ind. L.J. 433, 481 (1993) (stating that "[f]or
Establishment Clause purposes .... it may be necessary to discriminate among different
judicial uses of religious values" and that "three factors may be helpful in this process: (1)
the nature of the religious value; (2) the degree to which it informs the judge's decision
making; and (3) the manner in which it is employed by the judge") (emphasis in original);
Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 932 (1989).
51. See e.g. Teresa S. Collett, "The King's Good Servant, But God's First": The Role of
Religion in Judicial Decisionmaking, 41 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1277, 1278 (2000) ("This article
concludes by affirming the present judicial stance of allowing judges wide discretion in
determining whether their religious beliefs render them ineligible to hear particular cases,
and suggesting that it is both foolish and futile to promulgate laws, rules, or professional
norms that require agnosticism (or the public appearance of agnosticism) as a predicate to
holding judicial office or hearing particular cases.").
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advancing religion, this will offend the Establishment Clause.
52
At the same time, there is widespread recognition that very
few-if any-courts have actually found that improper religious
motivations compromised the actions of a judge acting within
the scope of his or her judicial duties.
53
Because the cost of reaching a decision or issuing an
opinion would not be affected by the religious motivations of the
judge, the simple fact that a decision was religiously motivated
would not give rise to taxpayer standing.
2. Facially Religious Statements and References in Judicial
Opinions
While the personal religious beliefs and motivations of the
judge are often difficult to ascertain, judges sometimes make
facially religious statements and references in written opinions
and in open court. It is unresolved whether or when such
references are appropriate under the Establishment Clause in the
absence of other evidence of religious purpose on the part of the
judge. When do we accept that the judge is harmlessly "gilding
the lily" with religious references, and when do such references
implicate the Establishment Clause?
These concerns have been most thoroughly reviewed by the
courts in the context of sentencing decisions. In Arnett v.
Jackson,54 for example, the Sixth Circuit reversed a district
52. See e.g. Idleman, supra n. 20, at 553 ("It does not require a great deal of
imagination to suppose that a judge's use of religious values might be driven by the
purpose of advancing religion or, alternatively, might lack a secular purpose."). Cf nn. 26-
33, supra, and accompanying text (discussing Glassroth holding that judicial conduct at
issue was inappropriate because its purpose was to advance religion).
53. Idleman, supra n. 20, at 555 ("There is, to my knowledge, no decision holding that
a judge's use of religion as a decisional factor violated the Establishment Clause."). Given
the practical difficulties inherent in ascertaining the motivations of public actors, the
absence of such cases is not surprising. Cf Kent Greenawalt, Religiously Based Judgments
and Discourse in Political Life, 22 St. John's J.L. Comm. 445, 491 (2007) (concluding that
while the author has "resisted the idea" that legislation of religious morality is never
unconstitutional, "as far as courts are concerned, and apart from situations in which a
religion or a specific religious outlook is promoted or endorsed, the limits on appropriate
grounds for laws are too narrow to have much practical significance").
54. 393 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2005). For many more examples of explicit judicial
reference to and use of the Bible and other religious authorities in reaching decisions, see
Sanja Zgonjanin, Student Author, Quoting the Bible: The Use of Religious References in
Judicial Decisionmaking, 9 N.Y. City L. Rev. 31 (2005).
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court's decision that the defendant's due process rights were
violated when the sentencing judge noted in a statement at the
sentencing hearing that she relied on the New Testament in
reaching her decision. In reversing, the Sixth Circuit
distinguished a line of cases that found the defendant's due
process rights violated when a judge took her own religious
viewpoints into account when sentencing, 55 stating that
[b]ecause the record does not demonstrate that the judge's
personally held religious beliefs formed "the basis of [her]
sentencing decision," we conclude that Arnett's due
process rights were not violated by the judge's Biblical
reference at sentencing.
56
This reasoning pointedly raises the following issue: Does a
judge's explicit reliance on religious authorities invalidate an
opinion, even if there is no evidence of the judge's subjective
intent to further religious goals?
The dissenting judge in Arnett took issue with the Sixth
Circuit majority on this very issue. 57 He noted that, while the
record may have been silent on the judge's personally held
religious beliefs, this was not relevant, given what was in the
record: Before pronouncing the defendant's sentence, the trial
judge explained that she had been "trying to determine in [her]
mind what type of sentence [Arnett] deserved in this particular
case." After noting several different sources of information from
which to make her decision, she confessed that she could not
answer the question "what sentence?" based solely on the
information she had received until she "answered [her] question
late at night when [she] turned to one additional source to help
[her]"-a series of verses from the New Testament, which read:
55. See e.g. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728. In Bakker, the Fourth Circuit held that the
sentencing judge had violated due process when sentencing a television evangelist for
fraud because the judge had commented that the defendant "had no thought whatever about
his victims and those of us who do have a religion are ridiculed as being saps from money-
grabbing preachers or priests." Id. at 740 (emphasis in original). Thus the judge exceeded
the boundaries of due process by "impermissibly tak[ing] his own religious characteristics
into account in sentencing." Id.
56. Arnett, 393 F.3d at 687-88. But see Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 Va.
L. Rev. 87, 163 n. 282 (2002) ("Some judges have explicitly invoked sectarian teachings as
a basis for their decisions .... But such behavior is ... inappropriate in any American
court.") (citation omitted).
57. Arnett, 393 F.3d at 689 (Clay, J., dissenting). The quoted information from the trial
record appears at 393 F.3d 684.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
And whoso shall receive one such little child in my name,
receiveth me. But, whoso shall offend one of these little
ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a
millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were
drowned in the depth of the sea.58
These verses, she explained, enabled her to resolve "the final
part of her struggle" to determine Arnett's sentence. Thus,
according to the dissent, "[t]he judge's statements at sentencing
undeniably show that this biblical tract played a significant,
determinative role in Arnett's sentence.,
59
The dissenting Sixth Circuit judge then squarely faced the
issue of the trial judge's personal beliefs:
Ultimately, the judge's reliance, or lack thereof, on her
personal religious beliefs is not critical to the due process
question in this case. In principle, there is nothing wrong
with a judge indirectly drawing upon her firmly-held
religious beliefs for moral guidance in resolving a case for
which the legal precedents provide no clear answer ... just
as an a-religious judge similarly might draw upon his or her
firmly-held secular beliefs .... When, however, a judge
directly and publicly relies on a religious source to reach a
specific legal result, she flouts a defendant's fundamental
expectation that he will not be adjudged according to any
religious tenets, regardless of whether the sentencing judge
herself adheres to those tenets.
60
Moreover, he recognized the Establishment Clause problem
inherent in this case, noting that
[a] judge's assumption of such authority is not only
fundamentally unfair to defendants, who expect to be
sentenced without regard to religious considerations, but
also erodes the "wall of separation between church and
State."
61
It seems clear that the dissenting judge had the better
argument on Establishment Clause grounds: Decisions and in-
court speeches that explicitly rely on religious reasoning in such
a pervasive way are constitutionally problematic, whatever the
58. Matthew 18:5-6 (King James).
59. Arnett, 393 F.3d at 689 (Clay, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 691 (Clay, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 691-92 (Clay, J., dissenting) (quoting Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878)).
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personal religious values of the judge. Even so, such decisions
do not result in any extra expenditure of funds on the part of the
judiciary, and so, despite their explicit religiosity, such non-
neutral decisions would not give rise to taxpayer standing.
III. HEIN AND ITS PROBLEMS
A. Factual Background
In 2001, the President issued executive orders creating the
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives
within the Executive Office of the President, as well as several
Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives within
various federal agencies and departments. The purpose of the
new Office was to ensure that
"private and charitable community groups, including
religious ones... have the fullest opportunity permitted by
law to compete on a level playing field, so long as they
achieve valid public purposes" and adhere to "the bedrock
principles of pluralism nondiscrimination,
evenhandedness, and neutrality.6J
The Centers "were given the job of ensuring that faith-based
community groups would be eligible to compete for federal
financial support without impairing their independence or
autonomy."
Shortly thereafter, the Freedom From Religion Foundation,
an advocacy group "opposed to government endorsement of
religion,"65 and some of its members, sued the directors of the
White House Office and various Executive Department Centers,
alleging that the Office and the Centers violated the
Establishment Clause by organizing conferences that were
"designed to promote, and had the effect of promoting, religious
community groups over secular ones," and that sent a message
to nonbelievers "that they are outsiders" and "not full members
62. Hein, 551 U.S. at 593-95 (citing Exec. Or. 13342, 3 CFR 180 (2004); Exec. Or.
13280, 3 CFR 262 (2002); Exec. Or. 13198, 3 CFR 750 (2001); Exec. Or. 13199, 3 CFR
752 (2001); Exec. Or. 13397, 71 Fed. Reg. 12275 (Mar. 7,2006)).
63. Id. at 594 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13199).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 595.
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of the political community." 66 The only basis for standing
asserted in the complaint was that the individual plaintiffs were
federal taxpayers "opposed to the use of Congressional taxpayer
appropriations to advance and promote religion." 67 In that
capacity, they challenged Executive Branch expenditures for the
conferences, which, they contended, violated the Establishment
Clause.
68
B. The Decisions Below
The District Court dismissed the claims for lack of
standing,69  concluding that, under Flast, federal taxpayer
standing is limited to cases in which a party "alleges[s] the
unconstitutionality . . . of exercises of congressional power
under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8., ,70 Because
the Office and the Centers acted "at the President's request and
on the President's behalf' and were not "charged with the
administration of a congressional program," the District Court
held that the challenged activities were "not 'exercises of
congressional power"' sufficient to support taxpayer standing
under Flast.
71
A divided panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed.72 The
majority read Flast as granting federal taxpayers standing to
challenge Executive Branch programs on Establishment Clause
grounds so long as the activities are "financed by a
66. Id.
67. Id. at 596.
68. Id.
69. See Freedom from Religion Found. v. Towey, No. 04-C-381-5 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 15,
2004) (mem. & order) (attached as Appendix B to petition for certiorari in Hein; available
at http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2006/2pet/7pet/2006-0157.pet.aa.pdf (accessed Dec.
15, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 990 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that "[t]he
question presented by this appeal is whether a taxpayer can ever have standing under
Article III of the Constitution to litigate an alleged violation of the First Amendment's
establishment clause unless Congress has earmarked money for the program or activity that
is challenged," and that "[t]he district judge thought not").
70. Towey, Appx. B to Pet. for Cert., supra n. 69, at 31a (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at
102).
71. Id. at 33a-34a.
72. Chao, 433 F.3d 989.
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congressional appropriation." 73 This is so, the majority held,
even where "there is no statutory program" enacted by Congress
and the funds are "from appropriations for the general
administrative expenses, over which the President and other
executive branch officials have a degree of discretionary
power. ' 74 According to the majority, then, a taxpayer should
have standing to challenge the actions of a federal executive
agency or officer so long as "the marginal or incremental cost to
the taxpaying public of the alleged violation of the establishment
clause" is greater than "zero.
' 7
In dissent, Judge Ripple contended that the majority's
decision constituted a "dramatic expansion of current standing
doctrine," that "cuts the concept of taxpayer standing loose from
its moorings." 76 Noting that "[t]he executive can do nothing
without general budget appropriations from Congress," he
criticized the majority for ignoring Flast's requirement that a
"plaintiff must bring an attack against a disbursement of public
funds made in the exercise of Congress' taxing and spending
power.,
77
C. Four Opinions in Hein
In deciding Hein, the Court released four opinions, none of
which constituted a majority opinion.78 The plurality opinion,
written by Justice Alito and joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Kennedy, denied taxpayer standing and reversed the
Seventh Circuit. Justice Kennedy issued a concurrence that
purported to join the plurality opinion in full, but appeared to
decide the case on narrower grounds. Justice Scalia (joined by
Justice Thomas) concurred in the result, but would have
reversed Flast, and would have thus completely eliminated
taxpayer standing in the federal courts. Finally, Justice Souter
73. Id. at 997.
74. Id. at 994.
75. Id. at 995 (pointing out that, in the case of a hypothetical taxpayer challenge to the
President's reference to "Moses rather than John Stuart Mill" in the State of the Union
address, "the marginal or incremental cost to the taxpaying public of the alleged violation
of the establishment clause would be zero").
76. Id. at 997-98 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1000 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
78. Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 1, at 125.
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issued an opinion for a four-justice minority that would have
read Flast broadly enough to support taxpayer standing in Hein,
and would have affirmed the decision below.
1. Justice Alito's Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion laid out a three-step analysis: First, as
a general matter, Justice Alito pointed out that
the interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that Treasury
funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution does
not give rise to the kind of redressable "personal injury"
required for Article III standing ... [because] this type of
interest is too generalized and attenuated./
7 9
Second, he noted that in Flast, the Supreme Court had used a
two-prong test to carve out a "narrow exception" to the general
prohibition against taxpayer standing,8 0 and he focused on the
first prong of that test: "[A] taxpayer will be a proper party to
allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional
power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, Sec. 8 of
the Constitution." 8' Third, he asserted that the spending at issue
in Hein-discretionary spending by the Executive Branch from
general Congressional appropriations--did not fall within the
Flast exception because it was not an exercise of Congressional
power under the taxing and spending clause, and was instead an
exercise of executive discretion.8 2 Thus, he concluded, taxpayers
had no standing to challenge the expenditures at issue in Hein.
Justice Alito forcefully asserted his conviction that the
primary fact distinguishing Hein from Flast was that the
expenditures in Flast were made "pursuant to an express
congressional mandate" and "funded by a specific congressional
79. Hein, 551 U.S. at 599-600 (discussing Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923)).
80. Id. at 602.
81. Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03). The second Flast prong is that "the
taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the
constitutional infringement alleged." Flast, 392 U.S at 102-03. In other words, "the
taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional
limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power." Id.
Because the taxpayers' challenge in Hein was based on the Establishment Clause, this
prong was satisfied. Hein, 551 U.S. at 602.
82. Id. at 605.
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appropriation." 83 In the absence of both, he pointed out, the
Court had never found taxpayer standing under Flast, and he
concluded that it would not do so in Hein. As to the taxpayers'
charge that any distinction drawn between money spent pursuant
to Congressional mandate and expenditures made in the course
of executive discretion must be arbitrary because the injury to
taxpayers is identical in each situation, Justice Alito had little to
say. He stated simply that "Flast focused on congressional
action, and we must decline this invitation to extend its holding
to encompass discretionary Executive Branch expenditures."
86
Justice Alito offered three justifications for declining to
extend Flast, all of which sound in judicial minimalism or
executive-specific concerns:
* First, "in the four decades since its creation, the
Flast exception has largely been confined to its
facts., 87 Thus, the Court has declined to apply
Flast in actions involving violations of any
constitutional provision apart from the
Establishment Clause, 88 and has "similarly refused
to ... permit taxpayer standing for Establishment
Clause challenges that do not implicate Congress'
taxing and spending power.,
89
o Second, "[b]ecause almost all Executive Branch
activity is ultimately funded by some
congressional appropriation," the Court's
"extending the Flast exception to purely executive
83. Id. at 604; see also id. at 605 (making the point that "[t]he link between
congressional action and constitutional violation that supported taxpayer standing in Flast
is missing here").
84. Id. at 605-08 (discussing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); and Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589
(1988)).
85. Id. at 609-10.
86. Id. at 609.
87. Id. at 609; see also id. at 615 ("[l]n the four decades since Flast was decided, we
have never extended its narrow exception to a purely discretionary Executive Branch
expenditure.").
88. Id. at 609 (citing cases).
89. Id. at 610 (citing cases).
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expenditures would effectively subject every
federal action . . . to Establishment Clause
challenge by any taxpayer in federal court."
90
* Third, extending Flast would "raise serious
separation-of-powers concerns" relating to
improper expansion of judicial powers at the
expense of the Executive Branch.91
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Although Justice Kennedy purported to join the plurality
opinion "in full,"'92 he also wrote a separate concurring opinion
that differed from the plurality opinion in two important
respects. First, in agreeing with Justice Alito that there should be
no taxpayer standing in Hein, Justice Kennedy focused
exclusively on the separation-of-powers concerns particular to
the case. He stated that courts "must be reluctant to expand their
authority by requiring intrusive and unremitting judicial
management of the way the Executive Branch performs its
duties," a reluctance that-in this case-pushed firmly in the
direction of denying taxpayer standing. 93 He wrote that
[p]ermitting any and all taxpayers to challenge the content
of... executive operations and dialogues would lead to
judicial intervention so far exceeding traditional boundaries
on the Judiciary that there would arise a real danger of
judicial oversight of executive duties.
94
Moreover, "were this constant supervision to take place the
courts would soon assume the role of speech editors for
communications issued by executive officials."
95
Indeed, Justice Kennedy made clear that his decision to
deny taxpayer standing in Hein was rooted in a line of cases
distinct from Flast, non-taxpayer cases that deny standing to
plaintiffs because of separation-of-powers concerns about
90. Id. at 610-11. This is an administrability argument.
91. Id. at 611. This is an executive-specific separation of powers argument.
92. Id. at 616 (Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
93. Id. at 617 (Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
94. Id. at 616-17 (Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
95. Id. at 617 (Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
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judicial intrusion into the internal workings of the Executive
Branch.96 After citing and quoting from these non-taxpayer
cases, he wrote that "[lt]he same principle applies here. The
Court should not authorize the constant intrusion upon the
executive realm that would result from granting taxpayer
standing in the instant case." 97 Justice Kennedy's opinion, then,
is rooted in a concern that maps onto Justice Alito's opinion but
is largely distinct from it; he implies that, were it not for the
judicial intrusion onto the Executive Branch that would be
occasioned by granting standing to the Hein plaintiffs, he would
not be troubled by a finding that they had satisfied the standing
requirements.
Justice Kennedy also emphasized that "the result reached in
Flast is correct and should not be called into question."
98
Specifically, he emphasized the distinction between the bedrock
Article III case-or-controversy limitation and the rather less
strict Article III separation-of-powers principles, pointing out
that sometimes (as in Hein) those principles lead to the
conclusion that there should be no taxpayer standing. But
sometimes, of course, they do not, so while the case-or-
controversy limitation can never be overridden, Flast and its
progeny were decided on separation-of-powers concerns that are
more flexible in certain circumstances. Thus, Flast "must be
interpreted as respecting separation-of-powers principles but
acknowledging as well that these principles, in some cases, must
accommodate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause."
99
96. Id. Justice Kennedy observed that in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423
(2006), "[t]he Court ...refused to establish a constitutional rule that would require or
allow 'permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental operations [of the
executive] to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and the separation
of powers"'; noted the holding in Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 382 (2004), that
separation-of-powers considerations should inform the judicial evaluation of a mandamus
petition involving the President or Vice President because of concerns about courts
"interfering with a coequal branch's ability to discharge its constitutional responsibilities";
and referred to the Court's statement in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984), that
separation-of-powers concerns "counsel[] against recognizing standing in a case brought..
. to seek restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its
legal duties." Id. at 617-18.
97. Id. at 617 (Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
98. Id. at 616 (Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
99. Id.
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3. Justice Scalia 's Opinion Concurring in the Judgment
Justice Scalia surveyed the Court's "notoriously
inconsistent"' 00 decisions on taxpayer standing over the eighty-
year period from Frothingham v. Mellon10 1 to DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno,102 and concluded that the essential problem is
that the Court has relied on "two entirely distinct conceptions"
of injury in fact, the first element of the "irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing."'1 3 These two conceptions
are "Wallet Injury" (a claim that the plaintiffs tax liability is
higher than it would be if not for the allegedly unlawful
government action) and "Psychic Injury" (the taxpayer's mental
displeasure that money extracted from him is being spent in an
unlawful manner). 104 Justice Scalia criticized the Court for
ruling on Psychic Injury inconsistently: While the Court upheld
taxpayer standing in Flast and some later cases based on Psychic
rather than Wallet Injury, it denied standing in other such cases.
Moreover, it "never explained why Psychic Injury, however
limited, is cognizable under Article III," because generalized
grievances based on the knowledge that a law is being violated
do not, as a general rule, create standing-worthy injuries.'
°5
Justice Scalia took the position that the Court must follow
the logic of Flast to its bitter end: If Psychic Injury is consistent
with Article III, the Court "should apply Flast to all challenges
to government expenditures in violation of constitutional
provisions that specifically limit the taxing and spending
power," and "if it is not, [the Court] should overturn Flast."'
'
Because Justice Scalia believes that Psychic Injury is too
insubstantial and insufficiently individualized to create an injury
in fact under Article II, he reached the conclusion that Flast
should be overruled. 10 7 Thus, he concurred in Justice Alito's
100. Id. at 618 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
101. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
102. 547 U.S. 332 (2006). Justice Scalia's discussion of the relevant cases decided
during those eight decades covers eight pages. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 620-28.
103. Id. at 619 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 620 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
106. Id. at 628 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in
original).
107. Id. at 637 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
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conclusion that there was no standing in Hein. Nevertheless, he
criticized the plurality for refusing to acknowledge this stark
choice, but instead drawing "meaningless and disingenuous
distinctions" that are lacking in "logic and reason," 10 8 and that
further "smudge" what the Seventh Circuit had characterized
below as the Court's already "arbitrary" and "illogical"
jurisprudence of taxpayer standing.
10 9
4. Justice Souter 's Dissenting Opinion
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Souter focused on the fact that
the injury in Flast was identical to the injury in Hein,1 ° but
Justice Souter concluded that the injury in both cases satisfied
Article III. There is, he noted, a "personal constitutional right
not to be taxed for the support of a religious institution,"' 11 the
violation of which satisfies the standing requirements of Article
III, for "the 'injury' alleged in Establishment Clause challenges
to federal spending is 'the very extract[ion] and spend[ing] of
tax money in aid of religion.""' -2
Disputing Justice Scalia's characterization of taxpayer
injury as Psychic Injury, Justice Souter described the taxpayer
injury asserted in an Establishment Clause case as a personal
constitutional right that is "in a class by itself," distinct from the
kind of non-justiciable policy disagreements that occur
108. Id. at 633 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
109. Id. at 636-37 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (citing Freedom
from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006)). Justice Scalia's opinion
did not escape criticism. See e.g. Richard Epstein, Scalia 's Judicial Activism, Wall St. J.
AI5 (June 29, 2007) ("Justice Scalia ... takes a blatantly anti-originalist position by
reading into the Constitution a limitation [on taxpayer standing across the board] found
neither in its text nor its basic structure, nor in the judicial practice running deep in our
history."); Hamilton, supra n. 6 (calling Justice Scalia's opinion "principled" but "utterly
wrongheaded and historically indefensible").
110. Id. at 639 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("When executive
agencies spend identifiable sums of tax money for religious purposes, no less than when
Congress authorizes the same thing, taxpayers suffer injury.").
111. Id. (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring), and pointing out that
"government in a free society may not 'force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his
property for the support of any one establishment' of religion." (quoting James Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in The Writings of James
Madison vol. 2, 183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1901)).
112. Id. at 638 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Cuno, 547
U.S. at 348) (alterations in original).
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whenever the Congress or the executive spends money.
113
Finally, Justice Souter pointed out that Establishment Clause
cases are not "unique in recornizing standing in a plaintiff
without injury to flesh or purse."
D. Reading Hein through Marks: Is There a Controlling
Opinion Here?
The first question that any court applying Hein needs to ask
is which of the four opinions, if any, is controlling. The Court in
Marks laid out the basic rule for ascertaining the precedential
value of the decision in a case in which there is a series of
opinions, and no clear majority opinion:
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgment on the narrowest grounds." 
115
In Hein, the narrowest opinion is either Justice Alito's or Justice
Kennedy's, as Justice Souter's opinion does not support the
result and Justice Scalia's opinion is by far the broadest of the
opinions supporting the judgment.1 6
A quick look at the holdings would suggest that Justice
Alito's opinion is controlling, as Justice Kennedy purports to
113. Id. at 641 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). For further discussion of the Marks
doctrine and the precedential effect of plurality opinions, including extended discussions of
the difficulty of applying Marks in certain categories of cases, see W. Jesse Weins, Student
Author, A Problematic Plurality Precedent: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Marks
over Van Orden v. Perry, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 830 (2007); Rafael A. Seminario, Student
Author, The Uncertainty and Debilitation of the Marks Fractured Opinion Analysis-The
U.S. Supreme Court Misses an Opportunity: Grutter v. Bollinger, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 739
(2004); Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 Theoretical Inq. L.
87 (2002); Adam S. Hochschild, Student Author, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court
Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 Wash. U. J.L. & Policy 261
(2000); Maxwell L. Steams, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of
Constitutional Law, 17 Const. Commentary 321 (2000); Linda Novak, Student Author, The
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 756 (1980);
Mark I. Levy, Plurality Opinions, 29 Natl. L. J. 13 (Feb. 12, 2007).
116. Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 1, at 130 ("Justice Scalia's opinion (urging the overruling
of a major precedent) is not narrow at all.").
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join the plurality opinion "in full., 11 7 Indeed, courts that have
invoked Hein have uniformly applied the Alito plurality opinion,
though they have rarely discussed the Marks doctrine in doing
so .118
However, a closer reading shows that, though Justice
Kennedy purports to join the plurality opinion in full, his
opinion departs from and is narrower than Justice Alito's on two
grounds. First, Justice Kennedy focuses exclusively on the
separation-of-powers rationale for declining to extend Flast to
the executive branch spending at issue in Hein.1 19 As we will
see, the separation-of-powers rationale does not apply to any
other category of taxpayer standing cases, which indicates that
Justice Kennedy would likely uphold taxpayer standing in some
situations in which the Chief Justice and Justice Alito would
not. 12  Second, Justice Kennedy would not confine Flast to its
facts, and does not believe that Flast should be "called into
question."' 12 1 Thus, as in Justice Breyer's concurrence in
Medtronic v. Lohr, it is actually Justice Kennedy's opinion that
should be considered controlling, despite the fact that it purports
to join the plurality in full.
122
117. Hein, 551 U.S. at 616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
118. See e.g. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State v. Prison
Fellowship Ministries, 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying plurality opinion without
discussing or citing Marks); Hinrichs, 506 F.3d at 597-99 (same); Tangipahoa Parish, 494
F.3d at 499-500 (DeMoss, J., concurring) (same). For examples of cases that do discuss or
cite Marks in applying Justice Alito's opinion, see In re: Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756,
760 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("Justice Alito's opinion... is the binding opinion of the Court in
[Hein]") (citing Marks); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Nicholson, 536 F.3d 730,
738 n. 11 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that Justice Alito's plurality opinion in Hein is controlling
because it "expresses the narrowest position taken by the Justices who concurred in the
judgment") (citing Marks).
119. See nn. 92-99, supra, and accompanying text; Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 1, at 130.
120. Not all commentators agree. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 1, at 130 n. 80 ("[W]e
recognize that choosing the Alito opinion over the Kennedy opinion, or vice versa, may not
make any tangible difference in the outcome of future cases in the lower courts.").
121. Hein, 551 U.S. at 616 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 1, at 130
(noting that "lower courts may perceive Kennedy's opinion to be 'narrower' than Alito's,
because Kennedy's opinion is more respectful of the pre-existing law, as reflected in
Flast").
122. See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004) (analyzing Medtronic v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)). In Horn, the Third Circuit held that Justice Breyer's
concurrence in Medtronic v. Lohr was the controlling opinion, even though he joined the
section of the plurality's opinion necessary to make the majority, because Justice Breyer
articulated a rationale that was "the more narrow of the two" and because Justice Breyer
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The difference between the Kennedy and Alito opinions for
the question of whether Hein applies to non-Executive taxpayer
spending is potentially vast. I will argue below that even
according to the Alito opinion, Hein should not be applied
outside the Executive spending context. But regardless of the
proper reading of Justice Alito's opinion, Justice Kennedy
would likely uphold broad taxpayer standing in taxpayer
spending cases outside the federal Executive Branch context.
With respect to judicial spending, there are certainly no
separation-of-powers concerns where the higher courts monitor
and control the activities of the lower courts, as there is no such
thing as intra-branch separation of powers. And Justice
Kennedy's separation-of-powers rationale for denying taxpayer
standing would not comfortably apply to state and municipal
spending either, as it is arises out of a wariness towards the
encroachment of the judiciary into the realm of federal executive
discretion. 123
It seems clear, then, that the Kennedy concurrence is
"narrower" than the Alito plurality opinion in Hein, and should
be treated as controlling under Marks-if in fact there is a
precedent-setting opinion at all. However, courts-including the
Supreme Court itself124-have struggled with the aplication of
the Marks "narrowest grounds" test for decades,"2 and have
"cast the so-called 'swing vote,' which was crucial to the outcome of the case and without
which there could be no majority." Horn, 376 F.3d at 175.
123. See Part III.C.2., supra (discussing Justice Kennedy's rationale). The harder
question for Justice Kennedy would be whether Hein should apply to limit taxpayer
standing in cases where both the taxing and spending is done by Congress, but there are no
specific, explicit appropriations for religious purposes. On the one hand, separation of
powers certainly comes into play in the context of judicial oversight over Congress. On the
other hand, judicial examination of Congressional legislation for violations of the
Constitution is at the heart of the Judicial power. See infra Part IV.D.2. Moreover, the
concept of "executive discretion" that plays such an important role in Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Hein has no corollary for the legislative branch.
124. See e.g. Nichols v. U.S., 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994) (stating that the Marks test is
"more easily stated than applied" and should not always be applied to find an opinion of
the Court, for "it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have
considered it"); see also U.S. v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2006) ("Marks ... has
proven troublesome in application for the Supreme Court itself and for the lower courts.").
125. See e.g. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64 (noting that the "understanding of 'narrowest
grounds' as used in Marks does not translate easily to the present situation" and discussing
"the shortcomings of the Marks formulation"); U.S. v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142,
1151 (10th Cir. 2006) ("When the plurality and concurring opinions take distinct
approaches, and there is no 'narrowest opinion' representing the 'common denominator of
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denied precedential effect to Supreme Court decisions where the
reasoning of the concurrence differed markedly from or was in
direct conflict with that of the plurality.126 In these cases, the
courts treat decisions of the Court as lacking a controlling
opinion applicable to future cases that are factually distinct from
the splintered decision; the only holding is the specific result of
the case.'
27
In Hein, though a majority was cobbled together by
combining the opinions of Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Scalia, it
is clear that the logic and reasoning of the Alito and Kennedy
opinions are in direct conflict with-and are disparaged by-the
Scalia concurrence in the judgment. Most importantly, Justices
Alito and Kennedy reach their respective conclusions within the
Flast framework, while Justice Scalia would overrule Flast
outright.128 Indeed, it is strange to think that three justices could
the Court's reasoning,' then Marks becomes 'problematic.") (quoting King v. Palmer, 950
F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991); King, 950 F.2d at 781 ("Marks is workable... only when.
. . the narrowest opinion... represents[s] a common denominator of the Court's reasoning;
it must embody a position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support the
judgment.").
126. See e.g. Tex. v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (plurality opinion) (holding that
Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443 (1971), itself a plurality opinion, was "not a binding
precedent"); King, 950 F.2d at 782 (holding that there is no "controlling opinion or
governing test" in Penn. v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 782
(1987) because Justice O'Connor's concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment is
one of "three distinct approaches to the issue of contingency enhancements in fee-shifting
statutes, none of which enjoys the support of five Justices," and noting of Coolidge that
although four justices agreed there on the controlling issue involving the inadvertence
requirement of the plain-view doctrine, "Justice Harlan's opinion concurring in the
judgment provided no reasoning by which one could discern his position" on it); U.S. v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003) (pointing out that "[w]hen it is
not possible to discover a single standard that legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground
for a decision on [an] issue, there is then no law of the land because no one standard
commands the support of a majority of the Supreme Court").
127. See cases cited in nn. 124-26, supra; U.S. v. Capers, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25852,
at *31 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2007) (noting that "the only holding is the specific
result" where the analysis of the concurrence "is simply different than that articulated by
the plurality, rather than a logical subset") (citing U.S. v. Cohen, 372 F. Supp. 2d 340, 354-
55 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
128. See nn. 79-109, supra, and accompanying text; see also n. 7, supra, and
accompanying text (providing examples of language from the Scalia opinion criticizing the
reasoning of the plurality opinion in unusually strong terms); Corn-Revere, supra n. 4, at
216 ("Justice Scalia's concurring opinion... read[s] more like an unusually tart dissent.).
The Alito and Kennedy opinions in Hein are subsets of the Scalia concurrence in the sense
that Justice Scalia would deny standing in every taxpayer case and Justices Alito and
Kennedy would deny taxpayer standing in only some cases. However, since Justice Scalia
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formulate the law of the land when the reasoning of the
"controlling" plurality opinion is passionately and directly
contested and criticized by six other justices. 129 Under this
approach, there is no controlling opinion in Hein, 130 and the
plurality opinion is binding only in the specific context in which
the Hein facts arose, which can be construed most broadly as
federal Executive Branch spending cases.
Nevertheless, recognizing that most courts have treated
Justice Alito's plurality opinion as controlling, this article turns
in the Part that follows to the prevailing interpretation and
application of Hein, and to an alternative reading that both
makes sense of the harshly-criticized plurality opinion, and
points the way towards the continued vitality of Establishment
Clause taxpayer standing.
IV. SAVING TAXPAYER STANDING
Many commentators-and indeed, six members of the
Court-have criticized the distinction drawn by the Hein
plurality between government expenditures expressly allocated
by specific Congressional enactment and Executive Branch
expenditures from general Congressional appropriations;' 3 1 the
primary criticism has been that the Article III injury to taxpayers
reaches his broad result in a way that is completely different from, and very much at odds
with, the opinions of Justices Alito and Kennedy, his opinion should not be combined with
those of Justices Alito and Kennedy to create a binding precedent. See nn. 100-09, supra.
129. As a district judge wrote recently in a similar case, "Marks should not be used to
'turn a single opinion that lacks majority support into national law."' Capers, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25852, at *34 (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d at 771, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
cf King, 950 F.2d at 782 ("When eight of nine justices do not subscribe to a given
approach to a legal question, it surely cannot be proper to endow that approach with
controlling force.").
130. See nn. 128-29, supra, and accompanying text.
131. See supra nn. 6-7; Hein, 551 U.S. at 633 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the
judgment) ("Minimalism is an admirable judicial trait, but not when it comes at the cost of
meaningless and disingenuous distinctions that hold the sure promise of engendering
further meaningless and disingenuous distinctions in the future. The rule of law is ill served
by forcing lawyers and judges to make arguments that deaden the soul of the law, which is
logic and reason."), 637 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("[T]he
controlling opinion closes the door on ... taxpayers because the Executive Branch, and not
the Legislative Branch, caused their injury. I see no basis for this distinction in either logic
or precedent.").
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is identical in both cases.13 2 And the courts that have applied
Hein based on this reading of the Alito plurality-and on the
further understanding that the Alito opinion controls-have felt
compelled to deny standing for lack of Article III injury where
the requirements of Hein are not met. This has occurred even in
cases raising questions that fall outside the federal Executive
Branch context, and despite the minimalist language of the Alito
opinion and the problems that courts have encountered in
applying its reasoning to non-Executive spending cases.
1 33
There are, however, better readings of Hein. As discussed
above, courts faced with non-Executive Branch or non-federal
taxpayer spending cases should apply Marks to reach the
conclusion that there is no precedent-setting opinion in Hein, or
at the very least that Justice Kennedy's executive-specific
opinion is controlling. Second, even if courts apply the Alito
plurality, they should read its denial of standing and its
distinction between legislative and executive spending as rooted
in case-specific separation-of-powers and prudential concerns,
rather than in Article III injury deficiencies. This reading both
answers critics of Justice Alito's distinction between legislative
and executive spending and suggests that courts should not
apply Hein outside the federal executive branch context. It is to
this "redemptive" reading of Hein that this article now turns.
A. Difficulties Applying Hein in Non-Federal Executive
Spending Cases
Numerous courts and commentators, along with the six
justices of the Scalia concurrence and the Breyer dissent, have
apparently understood Justice Alito's plurality opinion to be
rooted in the belief that there is no Article III injury to taxpayers
where there is no specific Congressional appropriation on behalf
of activities that allegedly violate the Establishment Clause. But
132. See e.g. Hein, 551 U.S. at 629 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment)
("As the dissent correctly contends, . . . Flast is indistinguishable from this case for
purposes of Article III."), 643 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("Flast
speaks for this Court's recognition (shared by a majority of the Court today) that when the
Government spends money for religious purposes a taxpayer's injury is serious and
concrete enough to be 'judicially cognizable."' (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 752)).
133. See infra nn. 134-46 and accompanying text.
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this reading of the Alito opinion has left courts struggling to
apply Hein to cases outside the federal executive branch. On the
one hand, if Hein delineates a narrow Article III minimum for
injury in taxpayer spending cases, then Hein should apply (and
effectively eviscerate taxpayer standing) even in cases outside
the federal Executive Branch; it would make no sense for Article
III injury to differ depending on the party doing the spending.'
34
On the other hand, since the Alito plurality is explicitly and
vigorously minimalist in its logic and in its own description of
its holding, focusing on executive-specific separation-of-powers
and administrability arguments, the concerns expressed in
declining taxpayer standing would appear to carry little or no
weight in judicial, state, and municipal spending cases.
1 35
One recent case that highlights the already developing
confusion and disagreement among the lower courts on this
question is Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives
of the Indiana General Assembly. 136 In Hinrichs, a Seventh
Circuit panel split on the question of whether the plaintiffs, state
taxpayers, had standing to sue the Indiana Speaker on the
ground that the Indiana House's practice of legislative prayer
violated the Establishment Clause. The majority held that Flast,
as explained by Hein, requires the taxpayer to point to a program
that is "mandated by statute," and to show that there is a
"specific appropriation of funds by the legislature to implement
the program" even in purely legislative action cases. 137 Thus,
because the prayer at issue in Hinrichs was mandated by a
134. See e.g. Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d at 761-63 (holding that Hein plurality opinion
establishes Article III minimum for taxpayer standing); Tangipahoa Parish, 494 F.3d at
499-500 (DeMoss, J., concurring) (citing Hein for the proposition that "a generally
available grievance about government.., does not constitute an injury in fact").
135. See e.g. Bats v. Cobb Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1318 n. 3 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
(distinguishing Hein in upholding taxpayer standing to sue county board of commissioners
and county planning commission for practice of beginning meetings with invocational
prayers: "Here, the expenditures attacked by Plaintiffs are made by a local legislative
body-the Cobb County Planning Commission-and thus Hein is inapposite."); Trunk v.
City of San Diego, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (finding taxpayer standing
in a case involving a challenge to a city's condemnation of land containing a large cross
and its likely use of tax funds to pay compensation to the landowner; declaring that "the
natural reading of the language of th[e Hein] opinion is that when a Congressional act
implicates the taxing and spending power, taxpayer standing is not precluded"; and
characterizing the discussion in Hein regarding the interpretation of Flast as "dicta").
136. 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007).
137. Id. at 598.
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House rule rather than by statute, and the appropriations funding
the prayer "'did not expressly authorize, direct, or even mention
the expenditures,"' the "nexus" required by Flast as explained in
Hein had not been shown.
138
Judge Wood, dissenting, contested this straightforward
application of Hein to legislative spending:
[t]he reason why the Alito plurality thought that the Flast
rule did not apply to the plaintiffs in Freedom From
Religion was simple: the plaintiffs were not challenging
legislative actions; instead, they were attacking Executive
Branch expenditures.
39
When, however, a challenge is made to an "unquestionably...
legislative act," the limitations of the Alito plurality in Hein do
not apply. 140 If, she said, the taxing and spending are done
wholly within the legislative branch-as in Hinrichs-the
legislative-action requirement is satisfied by the mere act of
taxing and spending, regardless of how specifically the
appropriation is made.
In addition, wholly apart from the legislative-executive
distinction made by Judge Wood, courts have questioned
whether Hein is ever applicable in state taxpayer standing cases.
The majority in Hinrichs had found that "state taxpayers are
held to the same standing requirements as federal taxpayers.'
142
But in Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc.,
143
for example, the Sixth Circuit distinguished both Hein and
Hinrichs in finding Article III injury (and with it, state taxpayer
standing) in the absence of a specific legislative appropriation to
fund the challenged activity. Noting that Justice Alito's opinion
138. Id.
139. Id. at 607 (Wood, J., dissenting). Judge Wood also noted that "[w]hile the
dissenters [in Hein] took the plurality to task for that distinction [between legislative and
executive expenditures], arguing that the Judicial Branch has no reason to distinguish
between the actions of the Executive Branch and those of the Legislative Branch, theirs
was not the prevailing voice." Id.
140. Id. at 609 (Wood, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 612 (Wood, J., dissenting) ("In my view, the taxpayer-plaintiffs before us
have alleged enough to win the right to present their challenge to the House Prayer before a
judicial forum. They are challenging a legislative act, and they have alleged concrete
pocketbook injuries.").
142. Id. at 598; see also Americans United, 509 F.3d at 420 (applying specific-
legislative-appropriations requirement to uphold taxpayer standing in state taxpayer case).
143. 579 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2009).
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"explicitly refused to alter the [pre-existing] standards for
taxpayer standing," the court "decline[d] to find that Hein
overrules [its] precedent that specifically instructs that [the]
nexus [between a specific legislative appropriation and the
challenged spending] is unnecessary in state taxpayer cases."
144
Moreover, the court specifically rejected the argument that
federalism or separation of powers concerns might compel a
narrower approach to standing in state taxpayer cases, finding
that "[t]hese concerns are [already] taken into consideration by
the strict requirement for taxpayer standing."'
145
These cases, which capture the jumbled post-Hein
decisional landscape, highlight some of the problems inherent in
applying Hein where the challenged spending occurs outside the
federal Executive Branch. Where the oversight that generated so
much concern in the plurality opinion-the judicial
encroachment on executive discretion-is absent, there is room
for courts to conclude that Hein does not imply or effect a
wholesale narrowing of Article III standing in all taxpayer
standing cases, or to reach just the opposite conclusion.' 
46
In the section that follows, this article will suggest a
reading for the lower courts to follow, which makes sense of the
plurality opinion on its own terms, while demonstrating that the
logic and reasoning of Justice Alito's opinion compel the
conclusion that Hein should not be applied to limit taxpayer
standing in cases outside the federal executive spending context.
B. Mission Impossible? Making Sense of the Alito Plurality
Justice Kennedy's denial of standing in Hein is rooted in an
independent line of cases that limit judicial intrusion into the
federal executive branch; he almost certainly rejects the position
that the denial of standing in Hein was rooted in a lack of Article
III injury in fact. 147 To the extent that courts are persuaded that
144. Id. at 731 n. 4, 732 (emphasis in original).
145. Id. at 733 n. 5; see also e.g. ACLUFound. ofLa. v. Blanco, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
74718, at *2, * 15-* 18 (E.D. La. 2007) (applying pre-Hein test in upholding state taxpayer
standing where state legislature's "unrestricted, unmonitored, non-neutral grants of state
taxpayer money" went to two churches).
146. See supra Part III.C.1.
147. See nn. 92-99, supra, and accompanying text.
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there is no controlling opinion in Hein, or that the Kennedy
opinion should be treated as the controlling opinion, they should
not apply Hein outside the executive context, and they should
not treat non-executive spending taxpayer actions with any
greater suspicion than they had pre-Hein; absent separation-of-
powers concerns, there is no reason to deny standing when a
governmental body spends taxpayer funds in violation of the
Establishment Clause.
But, despite what the critics have said, Justice Alito might
very well agree that the injury to the taxpayer is identical in
Flast and in Hein.148 As the critics have emphasized, Justice
Alito never attempts to make a principled distinction between
the injury in Flast and that in Hein.149 Instead, he concludes that
Flast should not be extended to cover executive spending based
on three factors, none of which implicates Article III injury. And
he joined the Chief Justice's near-unanimous opinion in Cuno,
which made clear that there is a personal right not to have
money spent in support of religion that is wholly unlike the
generalized grievances typically articulated in other taxpayer
actions. 15 Justice Alito never addresses this disjuncture head on
in Hein, but a close reading of the opinions leaves the distinct
impression that much of the huge gap between Justice Alito's
opinion on the one hand and those of Justice Scalia and Justice
Souter on the other has to do with Justice Alito's muscular
understanding of separation of powers in the executive context,
and prudential concerns about the courts being flooded by
taxpayer standing actions based on executive branch spending,
which the other justices (and many commentators) read as an
148. Despite my conclusion that the Kennedy opinion controls, courts that have applied
Hein have by and large applied the Alito plurality opinion. For this reason, my analysis
proceeds under the Alito opinion.
149. See supra nn. 79-91 and accompanying text (discussing Alito opinion); supra n. 7
(collecting commentators critical of the distinction).
150. See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 347-38 (distinguishing between general taxpayer injuries and
the injury alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending, where the injury
is "the very extraction and spending of tax money in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff'
and thus "fundamentally unlike" other taxpayer standing claims, and quoting Flast, 382
U.S. at 106) (quotation marks omitted). Only Justice Ginsburg did not join the Chief
Justice's opinion for the Court in Cuno, instead concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. Id. at 354-55.
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illogical attempt at drawing Article III injury distinctions
between legislative and executive spending. 151
Thus, although the Alito opinion certainly discusses Article
III injury in fact in its opening sections, 52 and although the
opinion recognizes that "the standing requirement[]... [is] 'an
essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of
powers," ' 153 once the opinion turns to the question of taxpayer
standing in Hein itself, the focus is not on general injury-in-fact
principles, but rather on a distinct and specific aspect of
separation of powers rooted in a respect for executive discretion
and a concern for prudential matters.
1 54
But, as in Justice Kennedy's analysis, that is not the end of
the inquiry for Justice Alito. Rather, despite the fact that the
injury in Hein satisfies Article III's basic case-and-controversy
injury-in-fact requirement (and thus meets the bare minimum for
the exercise of the judicial power), there is an independent facet
of separation of powers-special protection for executive
discretion-that counsels against standing in Hein. In addition,
Justice Alito invokes prudential factors-administrability and
narrow exception-that in his view counsel against taxpayer
standing in the specific circumstances in Hein.1
55
151. See e.g. nn. 6-7, 131,supra.
152. Hein, 551 U.S. at 599 (discussing Article III standing and stating that "[als a
general matter the interest of the federal taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are spent in
accordance with the Constitution does not give rise to the kind of redressable 'personal
injury' required for Article III standing") (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 611 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 101
(1998)).
154. See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court: 2006 Term: Foreword:
Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perception " Against Lofty Formalism, 121 Harv. L. Rev.
4, 95 (2007) (suggesting that "Justice Alito's opinion [is] written as if the burden of an
imagined flood of litigation were the major problem presented by the case").
155. For a discussion of anticipated criticisms of this reading, see infra notes 164-183
and accompanying text. But note that my reading parallels Judge Posner's recent decision
in Mainstreet Org. of Realtors, 505 F.3d 742, a third-party standing case suggesting that
Article III injury minimums are extremely broad that pointedly did not invoke Hein. In
contrast, Judge Sykes, concurring, cited Hein in concluding that he would have dismissed
the action for "lack of Article III standing" because the alleged injury is "a diffuse and
speculative harm" and "if the Supreme Court's recent standing jurisprudence means
anything, it is that constitutional standing prerequisites are to be closely monitored and
scrupulously enforced." Id. at 754 (Sykes, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). Judge
Sykes also cited Hein in stating that "I see little reason to think the Court would be inclined
to relax the constitutional minimums in third-party standing cases." Id. Judge Sykes thus
adopted a broad reading of Hein, one that would enable its Executive Branch taxpayer
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C. Back to Judicial Spending: Does Hein Apply?
Faced with a judicial spending case, courts that treat the
Alito plurality as controlling (and read it as I do) will have to
decide whether the opinion's separation-of-powers and
prudential concerns apply with equal force in Judicial Branch
spending cases.1 56 If they do not, then lower courts should
decline to apply Hein's limitations on taxpayer standing in
judicial spending cases.
First, because the judicial branch would be evaluating its
own discretionary activities in a judicial taxpayer standing case,
there is no separation of powers issue.' 57 The analysis would
instead involve the two prudential concerns discussed by the
plurality that weighed against standing in Hein: (1) The "narrow
exception" argument; and (2) the "slippery slope" argument. 
158
As to the first concern, while the narrow-exception
argument has some force in the judicial context in that the Court
has not applied Flast to judicial spending, this fact is not enough
on its own to deny standing. In the context of executive
spending, the plurality in Hein pointed to a number of cases in
which the Court-in the plurality's interpretation of the case
law-had declined to extend Flast to cases of executive
action.159 But in the case of the Judicial Branch, there is no
comparable history of Supreme Court hostility to taxpayer
standing; the Court has simply never faced such a case.
Moreover, the judicial branch is funded out of general
Congressional appropriations, and judicial spending is therefore
standing holding to bleed into other standing contexts.
156. The same sort of analysis regarding the applicability of Hein should be done in the
federal legislative (i.e. Congressional) and state and municipal taxpayer spending context,
as discussed infra in the Conclusion.
157. See nn. 120-23, supra, and accompanying text. The bottom line is that "intra-
branch separation of powers" is an oxymoron.
158. The "narrow exception" argument is that "in the four decades since Flast was
decided, we have never extended its narrow exception to a purely discretionary Executive
Branch expenditure." Hein, 551 U.S. at 614. The "slippery slope" argument is that
"[b]ecause almost all Executive Branch activity is ultimately funded by some congressional
appropriation, extending the Flast exception to purely executive expenditures would
effectively subject every federal action-be it a conference, proclamation, or speech-to
Establishment Clause challenge by any taxpayer in federal court." Id. at 610. For a fuller
discussion of the Alito plurality opinion, see notes 79-91, supra, and accompanying text.
159. Hein, 551 U.S. at 605-07 (discussing cases).
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arguably "Congressional action." Though this was not enough in
Hein to overcome the countervailing executive-independence
separation-of-powers concerns, in the context of judicial
spending it might be enough to satisfy the "Congressional
action" requirement.
The slippery slope administrability concern is similarly
attenuated in judicial spending cases. First, the slippery slope
cases about which the Court is explicitly concerned in the
judicial context would be easily disposed of on the merits.
160
Justice Scalia, in the only discussion of judicial spending in
Hein, says that the Court cannot uphold taxpayer standing in
every instance in which the government expends funds because
[a]ny taxpayer would be able to sue whenever tax funds
were used in alleged violation of the Establishment Clause.
So, for example, any taxpayer could challenge the fact that
the Marshal of our Court is paid, in part, to call the
courtroom to order by proclaiming "God Save the United
States and this Honorable Court."
' 161
This formulation works well rhetorically, but the specter of
plaintiffs descending on the Supreme Court to challenge its call
to order serves merely as a straw man. In fact, these cases would
be easily disposed of on the merits as involving only ceremonial
deism, as the Supreme Court has already acknowledged on
multiple occasions.
1 62
160. See nn. 44-46, supra, and accompanying text. As discussed in Part II, judicial
spending cases are likely limited to public displays, which are widely recognized to be
constitutionally problematic and appropriate for judicial challenge, and invocations such as
"God save this honorable Court," which seem, at least when part of a longstanding
tradition, not to be so. It is the possibility that a plaintiff could challenge these invocations,
and others like them, that has really driven the slippery slope argument in the judicial
context.
161. Hein, 551 U.S. at 632 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
162. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 37 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Th[e]
category of 'ceremonial deism' most clearly encompasses such things as the national motto
('In God We Trust'), religious references in traditional patriotic songs such as the Star-
Spangled Banner, and the words with which the Marshal of this Court opens each of its
sessions ('God save the United States and this honorable Court')."); see also County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("Practices such as legislative prayers or opening Court
sessions with 'God save the United States and this honorable Court' serve the secular
purpose of solemnizing public occasions and expressing confidence in the future," are
"examples of ceremonial deism," and thus do not violate the Establishment Clause)
(citation and some quotation marks omitted); Hein, 551 U.S. at 640 n. 1 (Souter, Stevens,
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Sectarian pre-session prayers offered by judges, and judge-
controlled Ten Commandments displays, discussed in Part II,
might have more merits substance. But the number of such cases
would likely be rather limited, as challenges to judicial conduct
in violation of the Establishment Clause in general are already
rather limited in number. To the extent that a limited number of
such actions were meritorious, they should be permitted to go
forward, rather than being disposed of on lack-of-standing
grounds. 163 At the same time, religiously motivated and facially
non-neutral judicial decisions, also discussed in Part 1I, do not
involve the expenditure of any extra funds, and for that reason
would not give rise to taxpayer standing. Thus, there is little risk
of inundating the federal courts with plaintiffs suing over
taxpayer-funded invocations and other alleged judicial-spending
violations.
Moreover, the judiciary spends only a fraction of the
money that the executive and legislative branches spend, and the
vast majority of its spending is on activities that are not in any
way conceivably challengeable under the Establishment Clause.
In contrast, as the Court in Hein emphasized, a substantial
amount of executive discretionary spending is for activities and
programs that touch on the Establishment Clause, such as
speeches that mention God or religion, meetings with religious
leaders, and a whole host of funding decisions such as financial
underwriting of the non-religious activities of religious
organizations.
Thus, given the important differences between Executive
and Judicial branches from the perspective of separation of
powers, "narrow exception," and administrability/slippery slope,
the Alito plurality opinion--even if controlling-should not be
understood to limit taxpayer standing in challenges to Judicial
Branch spending in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("If these claims are frivolous on the merits, I fail to see
the harm in dismissing them for failure to state a claim instead of for lack of jurisdiction.").
163. Hein, 551 U.S. at 640 n. 1 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
("To the degree the claims are meritorious, fear that there will be many of them does not
provide a compelling reason.., to keep them from being heard.").
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D. Likely Criticisms of This Reading
I anticipate two main objections to my suggestion that Hein
should not be understood to narrow taxpayer standing outside
the federal Executive Branch context. 164 First, one could argue
that generalized grievances such as those articulated in most
taxpayer standing cases do not give rise to Article III injury in
fact, so I must be reading the Alito opinion incorrectly when I
claim that Justice Alito does not base his denial of standing in
Hein on a lack of Article III injury. 165 Second, one could argue
that this reading makes no more sense than the prevailing
reading, because it retains the distinction between executive and
legislative spending. Though it shifts the focus of the distinction
to separation of powers, a critic could argue that there is in fact
no difference from the perspective of separation of powers
between judicial oversight of the legislative branch and judicial
oversight of the executive branch.
166-
1. Generalized Grievances
My reading might be criticized with the argument that
grievances that are generally and equally available to all citizens
do not give rise to Article III standing. 67 However, this reading
makes the Alito plurality indistinguishable from the Scalia
opinion, 168 and if true, it would suggest that the Court should
have eliminated taxpayer standing altogether. In addition, this
argument is unavailing on its own terms.
First, the Court has made clear that widely shared injuries
satisfy Article III as long as the harm caused is "concrete."'
169
164. The most obvious objection-the suggestion that I am misreading or misapplying
Justice Alito's opinion-is dealt with directly in my discussion of the Alito opinion and its
application. See nn. 147-55, supra, and accompanying text.
165. See infra n. 167-79 and accompanying text.
166. See infra n. 180-83 and accompanying text.
167. Hein, 551 U.S. at 635-36 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
168. Hinrichs, 506 F.3d at 610 (Wood, J., dissenting) ("This reading of Freedom From
Religion would effectively adopt Justice Scalia's concurring opinion for himself and
Justice Thomas advocating the overruling of Flast, in contravention of the rule in Marks.").
169. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (stating that the Court "has sometimes
determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather
than the judicial process, may provide the appropriate remedy" but that this is the case only
"where the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite
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Thus, an injury solely to a plaintiffs interest in seeing that the
law is obeyed does not give rise to standing,' 70 nor does an
injury to the general interest in seeing taxes spent for legal
purposes.' 7 ' But an injury to informational rights directly related
to voting, which would seem analogous to an injury to the long-
recognized "right not to contribute three pence... for the
support of any one [religious] establishment," indisputably does
give rise to standing, even though the grievance is generalized,
because it is also concrete and particular. 172 Thus, despite Justice
Scalia's protestations to the contrary, where standing is denied
on account of a generalized grievance, it is denied out of
prudential concerns.173
nature," and that "[o]ften the fact that an interest is abstract and the fact this it is widely
shared go hand in hand," but acknowledging that "their association is not invariable, and
where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found 'injury in fact')
(citations omitted); Public Citizen v. Dept. of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989) ("The fact
that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same complaint ... does not lessen
[their] asserted injury."); see also Hein, 551 U.S. at 641-42 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg &,
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citing cases finding "injury in fact" where the harm is generalized
and non-economic).
170. L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R. Co., 311 U.S. 295, 303 (1940) (pointing out that
"[t]he complainant must possess something more than a common concern for obedience to
law").
171. See Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487 (stating that the plaintiff's "interest in the
moneys of the Treasury ... is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and
indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation . . . so remote, fluctuating and
uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court");
Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344 (stating that "[s]tanding has been rejected ... because the alleged
injury is not 'concrete and particularized' .... [and] the injury is not 'actual or imminent,'
but instead 'conjectural and hypothetical') (citations omitted).
172. See Akins, 524 U.S. at I ("We conclude that ... the informational injury at issue
here, directly related to voting,... is sufficiently concrete and specific such that the fact
that it is widely shared does not [prevent] ... its vindication in the federal courts.").
173. Hein, 551 U.S. at 642 n. 3 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
("Although the plurality makes much of the fact that the injury in this case is 'generalized,'
... those properties on their own do not strip a would-be plaintiff of standing.") (citing
Akins); see also Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991). Cf
Tangipahoa Parish, 494 F.3d at 499 (DeMoss, J., concurring) (distinguishing between
constitutional limitation to standing that emphasizes "injury in fact" and "another important
purpose of the standing requirement[, which] is to ensure separation of powers" recognized
in Hein); Hinrichs, 506 F.3d at 604 (Wood, J., dissenting) ("Whether the restrictions on
taxpayer standing derive from one or more of [the] basic Article III constraints or if they
stem from a rule of self-restraint has been unclear. Because no one Justice spoke for a
majority of the Supreme Court in Freedom from Religion, the question may still be
debatable."). Indeed, in the classic case that laid out the general rule against federal
taxpayer standing, the Court indicated that prudential concerns were central to its decision
to deny taxpayer standing in the typical case. See Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487 ("If one
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Indeed, the Court recently reaffirmed, in a near-unanimous
opinion by the Chief Justice that was joined by Justices Alito
and Kennedy, that the injury in Establishment Clause taxpayer
standing cases is "fundamentally unlike" the non-concrete
injuries in other taxpayer spending cases, as there exists a "right
not to contribute three pence.., for the support of any one
[religious] establishment." 174 Given that the four justices in
dissent in Hein state explicitly that generalized grievances can
pass Article III muster, and given that Justice Alito says nothing
to contest this notion, it would be difficult to argue that Justice
Alito meant implicitly to overrule the Court's generalized
grievances jurisprudence in his plurality opinion in Hein.1
75
Second, the Court has consistently held that municipal
taxpayer standing rests on the bare taxing and spending by a
municipality for illegal purposes. 176 In this context, the Article
III injury is the use of an individual's taxes for illegal purposes,
with nothing more. 177 This is a strong indication that the bare
taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer may do [the]
same, . . . in respect of every other appropriation act and statute whose administration
requires the outlay of public money .... The bare suggestion of such a result, with its
attendant inconveniences, goes far to sustain the conclusion which we have reached, that a
suit of this character cannot be maintained.").
174. See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 347-48 (distinguishing between general taxpayer injuries and
the injury alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending, in which the
injury is "the very extraction and spending of tax money in aid of religion alleged by a
plaintiff' and thus "fundamentally unlike" other taxpayer standing claims) (quoting Flast,
382 U.S. at 106) (quotation marks omitted). Only Justice Ginsburg did not join the Chief
Justice's opinion for the Court in Cuno. Instead, she concurred in part and concurred in the
judgment. Id. at 354-55.
175. But see Hinrichs, 506 F.3d at 604 (Wood, J., dissenting) ("[B]ecause Justice Alito
relied squarely on Article III in his rejection of taxpayer standing in [Hein], I assume for
the sake of argument that we are dealing with a restriction on standing that is grounded in
the Constitution.").
176. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486-87 (noting the "rule frequently stated by this Court"
that "resident taxpayers may sue to enjoin an illegal use of the moneys of a municipal
corporation" and distinguishing municipal taxpayer standing from its federal corollary
because of "the peculiar relation of the corporate taxpayer to the corporation" and the
prudential concern for the "inconveniences" that will ensue if "every [federal] taxpayer"
can bring taxpayer suits); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1989) (reiterating
distinction between federal taxpayers and their municipal counterparts); Cuno, 547 U.S. at
345, 349 (reaffirming distinction but denying standing because the "rationale for rejecting
federal taxpayer standing applies with undiminished force to state taxpayers" and these
plaintiffs "identify no municipal action contributing to any claimed injury").
177. There is very little scholarship on state taxpayer standing, and almost none on
municipal taxpayer standing. Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a
(Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 Emory L.J. 771, 773-75 (2003) (surveying the field
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minimum for Article III injury in the taxpayer context is taxing
and spending for illegal purposes, and that Hein's far narrower
scope comes from some other line of authority.
178
Thus, while plaintiffs in taxpayer standing cases do of
course have to satisfy Article III injury in fact, the available
evidence indicates that Article III requires a much looser
connection between taxing and spending than that articulated in
Hein, at least in Establishment Clause cases. And that looser
connection would be satisfied with the simple fact that a
taxpayer's "three pence" has been spent by the government in
violation of the Establishment Clause. 1
79
of taxpayer standing scholarship and noting that "legal scholars ignore state and municipal
taxpayers" in discussing taxpayer standing). Indeed, Staudt describes her systematic study
of taxpayer lawsuits by municipal, state, and federal taxpayers as the "begin[ing of] an
exploration of a topic that legal scholars have left entirely unexamined." Id. at 775.
Staudt's work itself appears to stand as the sole exception to the general absence of in-
depth analysis of municipal taxpayer standing.
In the realm of state taxpayer spending the lacunae have been filled .somewhat by the
Court's decision in Cuno and scholarship relating to that case. See e.g. Kristin E. Hickman,
How Did We Get Here Anyway? Considering the Standing Question in DaimlerChrysler v.
Cuno, 4 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Policy 47 (2006). It is also worth noting that, despite the clear
distinction drawn by the Court between federal and state taxpayers on the one hand and
municipal taxpayers on the other hand, see n. 176, supra, both lower courts and legal
scholars have sometimes conflated the state and municipal taxpayer spending analyses. See
e.g. Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 1, at 146 (stating that "[t]he Court has... consistently treated
federal, state, and local taxpayers as indistinguishable for purposes of taxpayer standing in
federal court" in discussing whether state and local taxpayers should be treated differently
from federal taxpayers after Hein).
178. Indeed, the Court has found Article III injury in a wide range of non-pocketbook
and non-bodily injuries. See nn. 169-74, supra, and accompanying text. The cases cited
there demonstrate convincingly that Article III injury can come in a variety of non-
pocketbook forms.
179. Richard Epstein makes an even bolder claim: that nothing in Article III limits who
counts as a proper plaintiff, and that Article III should not be relied upon to deny taxpayer
standing at all:
Any defender of limited government who believes in an originalist interpretation
of the Constitution should reject, root-and-branch, the court's hostility to
taxpayer standing.
The proper rule should allow all taxpayers free rein to challenge either Congress
or the executive branch for overstepping their constitutional authority.
At stake is whether judicial review itself remains as a check on the political
branches.
[L]imits on taxpayer standing do not derive from any textual command. They
rest on a serious misreading of the constitutional text, which contains no
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2. Distinction between Executive and Legislative Spending
My reading of the plurality opinion could also be criticized
on the grounds that it merely shifts the "unprincipled"
distinction between legislative and executive spending from the
question of injury in fact to that of separation of powers. Indeed,
Justice Scalia and the dissent make this argument in criticizing
the separation-of-powers analysis in the plurality opinion.'
80
However, while it is true that separation of powers
concerns inform the relationship among all three branches, there
is a long-recognized, fundamental distinction between judicial
review of Congressional law-making and judicial review of
discretionary executive activities. Most importantly, "the very
essence of the judicial duty" is the review of Congressional law-
making for unconstitutional activities.' 81 In contrast, the judicial
power is at its nadir when courts review Executive Branch
discretionary activities.
1 82
standing requirement at all.
Nothing [in Article III] limits who counts as a proper plaintiff. It is therefore a
supreme sleight-of-hand to assume that Article III justifies this self-imposed
limit on judicial power.
Epstein, supra n. 109.
180. Justice Souter writes that
[t]he plurality points to the separation of powers... but there is no difference on
that point of view between a Judicial Branch review of an executive decision and
a judicial evaluation of a congressional one. We owe respect to each of the other
branches, no more to the former than to the latter, and no one has suggested that
the Establishment Clause lacks applicability to executive uses of money.
Hein, 551 U.S. at 639-40 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Similarly, if somewhat less explicitly, Justice Scalia writes that "I cannot begin to
comprehend how the amorphous separation-of-powers concerns that motivate [Justice
Kennedy] bear upon whether the express-allocation requirement grounded in the Article III
criteria of injury in fact, traceability, or redressability." Id. at 630 n. 3 (Scalia & Thomas,
JJ., concurring in the judgment).
181. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803).
182. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 616-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing and discussing
cases); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., The Federal Courts and The Federal System 254 (5th
ed., Found. Press 2003) ("[I]n Marbury itself Chief Justice Marshall suggested that
questions should be deemed 'political,' and therefore not subject to judicial review, if non-
judicial officers possessed 'discretion' to act as they did in the circumstances."). This long-
established limitation on the judicial power, commonly known as the political question
doctrine, can also be framed as a recognition of the limits of the judicial power in the face
of executive discretionary activities. See e.g. Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1983)
(stating that "[a] controversy is nonjusticiable-i. e., involves a political question-where
TAXPAYER STANDING: INTERPRETING HEIN
Indeed, in Marbury v. Madison, the Court made just this
distinction between claims that require the courts to "enquire
how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion"-which is not the "province of the
court"-and claims "not depending on executive discretion, but
on particular acts of congress" over which the court has
authority to exercise the judicial power.'83
Thus, the distinction made by Justice Alito between weak
judicial oversight of executive discretionary activities and strong
oversight of purely legislative spending both explains the
plurality's denial of standing in Hein and makes perfect sense in
the context of separation of powers. But it would not justify a
denial of taxpayer standing in cases that do not implicate
executive discretion.
V. CONCLUSION
Ideally, when the Supreme Court decides a case, it does so
with such clarity of language and force of logic that there is no
doubt as to the correctness of the opinion and the scope and
manner of its applicability to future cases. But when a
preference for judicial minimalism, a muddled body of
underlying substantive law, and the reality of a fractured court
meet in one case, as they did in Hein, the lower courts are
sometimes left scratching their proverbial heads, struggling to
make sense of and apply a decision.
The lower courts have already begun this process with
Hein. Overlooking the possibility that there may be no
controlling opinion at all, and reading the Alito plurality opinion
broadly despite its Executive-specific reasoning and overt
minimalism, some courts have applied Hein's strict
requirements for federal Executive Branch taxpayer standing to
cases involving state and municipal taxpayers and purely
legislative actions. This reading of Hein transforms the almost-
there is 'a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it,"' in a challenge to the Senate's procedures for handling articles of
impeachment adopted against a federal district judge) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217 (1962)).
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uniformly criticized opinion of three Justices into the law of the
land, turns the logic and reasoning of the plurality opinion on its
head, and if it takes hold, will effectively eliminate taxpayer
standing in actions challenging violations of the Establishment
Clause.
But there are ways for the lower courts to "save" taxpayer
standing, and at the same time to make sense of the Alito
plurality opinion. First, if the lower courts engage in a full
Marks analysis, they should conclude that there is no precedent-
setting opinion in Hein; at the very least, they should find that
Justice Kennedy's narrow concurring opinion is controlling, and
that it should not be understood to tighten taxpayer standing
outside the federal Executive Branch context. Second, even if
the lower courts continue to treat the Alito plurality opinion as
controlling, they should understand that much of the criticism of
the plurality opinion has been driven by a misunderstanding of
the distinction between legislative and executive spending that is
at its heart. Understood properly, the distinction (and the strict
holding regarding taxpayer standing that it generates) is not
about different injuries, but is instead rooted in a heightened
concern for the inappropriate invasion by the Judicial Branch
into the realm of executive discretion, and executive-specific
prudential concerns.
For all of these reasons, Hein should be understood as a
narrow decision particular to the federal Executive Branch. The
implications of this new reading of Hein for the doctrine of
taxpayer standing are potentially vast, as federal executive
spending cases make up only a small portion of taxpayer
standing cases. I have demonstrated in this article that Hein
should not be understood as a barrier to taxpayer standing in
judicial spending cases, but my analysis has implications for
Congressional, state, and municipal taxpayer standing cases as
well. Since Justice Alito's plurality opinion does not constitute
the law of the land, and since his opinion--even if controlling-
is rooted in executive-specific concerns, courts are free to
decline to apply Hein in the vast majority of taxpayer standing
cases. Thus, despite the Supreme Court's re-entrance into the
field in Hein, the power to save taxpayer standing remains in the
hands of the lower courts.
